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265 
FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS IN CORPORATE 
“CONTRACTS” 
Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan* 
 
Abstract: We consider the emergent practice of including clauses in corporate certificates 
of incorporation or bylaws that specify an exclusive judicial forum for lawsuits. According to 
their proponents and most courts that have considered the question, such forum-terms are, and 
should be, enforceable as contractual choice-of-forum provisions. 
We argue that treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms as a matter of ordinary 
contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified. Because charters and bylaws involve the state 
in ways that are at odds with private-ordering principles and because they entail only a limited 
form of “consent,” an analysis of enforceability must account for the hybrid nature—public 
and private—of such terms. Specifically, the state’s role should render forum-terms invalid 
that oust federal courts of diversity jurisdiction. Likewise, because of a lack of any meaningful 
consent, a forum-term that applies to a claim that is neither derivative nor brought by a 
shareholder should not be enforced. In other situations, courts should consider, before 
enforcing a corporate forum-term, whether adjudicating the entire dispute in the designated 
forum would be efficient (e.g., whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over all 
claims) or fair (e.g., whether the procedural rules, including the limitations period, of the 
designated forum are substantially more advantageous to the parties who decided to adopt the 
forum-term than those of the state that supplies the substantive law). In some cases, efficiency 
and fairness factors will argue against the forum-term’s enforcement. 
On the other hand, several factors in other corporate settings and, in particular, in merger-
related representative suits, may tip the balance towards enforcement. First, the fact that 
“consent” by class members to these suits is also limited counter-balances concerns about the 
limited consent shareholders may have given to the forum-term. Second, a forum-term reduces 
the ability to avoid the crack-down on “disclosure-only” settlements—that provide broad 
releases, but entail minimal recovery—that Delaware courts have embarked on. 
Finally, we consider the implications of corporate forum-terms to debates about interstate 
competition for incorporation and for corporate litigation. A state may adopt forum-term 
legislation to enhance its attractiveness as a corporate domicile or to protect shareholders in 
domestic corporations. However, legislation that discriminates against out-of-state courts and 
seeks to centralize corporate litigation in the state’s own courts for the benefit of its local bar 
may be vulnerable to non-enforcement in the courts of sister states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful 
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor 
less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “Whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said 
Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”1 
 
What is a corporation, and why does it matter? A century ago, the U.S. 
Supreme Court treated the corporation as a creature of the state, making 
it subject to any condition that a state chose to impose.2 “The only rights” 
a corporation could claim, Justice Taney explained in Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 3 “are the rights which are given to it” in the corporation’s charter, 
and “not the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state.”4 
                                                     
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 205 (1934). 
2. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. 
L. REV. 767, 768 (1989) (describing the theory). 
3. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
4. Id. at 587. 
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The Court eventually retreated from this view, granting the corporation 
procedural rights against the federal and state governments under the Due 
Process Clause,5 and later according it protection for speech otherwise 
within the scope of the First Amendment.6 Despite this doctrinal shift, the 
Court saw no contradiction in rejecting a challenge under the Commerce 
Clause to anti-takeover legislation, relying upon the earlier conception of 
the corporation as a creature of the state.7 
On a separate track, finance scholars cast the corporation as a contract 
or as a nexus of contracts.8 Within the corporation-as-contract model, 
corporate law—and especially the corporate law of Delaware, as the state 
with the premier corporate law in the United States—is said to function 
as an enabler of corporate choice, free of public regulation.9 Not 
surprisingly, the existing legal landscape has been criticized as incoherent 
and inconsistent.10 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that how courts characterize the 
corporation significantly affects legal doctrines that impact not only the 
corporation, but also third parties such as shareholders, vendors, and 
political candidates. The characterization question is important even for 
the most technical sounding rules of corporate practice. In this Article, we 
consider an emergent practice—including a clause in a corporation’s 
charter or bylaws that specifies and so limits where lawsuits may be 
filed—as a window into larger issues of state power and private ordering. 
So far, state courts and lower federal courts that have considered the 
question have applied a contractual approach to determining whether 
                                                     
5. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (noting that it is well-established 
that the corporation is entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
corporation must comply with Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
6. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (“The Court has recognized that First 
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”). 
7. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).  
8. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The nexus-of-contracts 
conception of the corporation has many critics. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That 
the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 
n.2 (1999) (“The conception has never lacked critics.”). 
9. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 
1426 (1989) (referring to the “voluntary adventure” of corporate investing). 
10. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 785, 797 n.69 (“Supreme Court rulings have not adopted a consistent view of corporate 
personhood.”). But see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 95, 100 (2014) (“The Court adopts a consistent approach, but the approach proceeds right-
by-right, rather than by starting with a theory of organizations or corporations as constitutional 
actors.”).  
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corporate forum-terms are valid or enforceable.11 It is old news that the 
parties to a contract are allowed to do things that the state cannot. Quite 
apart from specifying terms like price or quality, ordinary commercial 
contracts regularly include clauses saying where the parties to the contract 
can sue should a dispute arise.12 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the 
validity of contractual forum-selection terms under contract principles, on 
the view that it is efficient and fair to let the parties decide where and how 
to litigate.13 Under the corporation-as-contract conception, permitting a 
corporate charter or bylaw, the constitutive documents of a corporation, 
to specify where shareholders can sue the company would seem the 
logical next doctrinal step.14 Indeed, a leading corporate lawyer has called 
the use of forum-terms in corporate charters and bylaws simply “another 
brick in the wall” of private ordering.15 
We say: not so fast. Treating corporate charter and bylaw forum-terms 
as a matter of ordinary contract doctrine is neither logical nor justified. 
No doubt, there is a family resemblance between a corporate charter or 
bylaw and an ordinary contract.16 But a corporation’s charter and bylaws 
are no ordinary contracts. Rather, they are hybrid legal structures that 
provide a mechanism for collective choice in the context of substantial 
state regulation and straddle the public-private divide in ways that make 
them quite dissimilar from ordinary contracts. Indeed, their unusual 
                                                     
11. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
507 (2011) (discussing the Court’s contractual approach to forum-selection terms). 
12. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2009) (reporting evidence “that choice of law and choice of forum provisions 
are negotiated in the material contracts of public firms”).  
13. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (upholding validity of forum-
term if “it is freely bargained for and contravenes no important public policy of the forum”); Geoffrey 
P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2089 (2009) 
(discussing the autonomy rationale for enforcement of forum-selection terms by New York courts).  
14. See George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 609, 611 (2016) (“By 
conceptualizing the corporation as a collection of negotiated agreements between the firm and 
individual shareholders, proponents of ex-ante governance defend unilateral bylaw initiatives as the 
permissible product of flexible private ordering.”); Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by 
Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 531 (2016) (urging “expansive use” of tailored procedure for corporate 
governance). 
15. William Savitt, Forum-Selection Bylaws—Another Brick in the Wall, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04 
/10/forum-selection-bylaws-another-brick-in-the-wall/ [https://perma.cc/UAV7-Q8DJ]. 
16. See Robert Borowski, Combatting Multiforum Shareholder Litigation: A Federal Acceptance 
of Forum Selection Bylaws, 44 SW. L. REV. 149, 150 (2014) (“[B]ylaws are generally treated as 
contracts between corporations and their shareholders.”); Henry duPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role 
of Bylaws in Corporate Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 317, 323 (2015) (“[C]orporate bylaws are 
merely contractual agreements between the corporation, its directors, and the stockholders.”).  
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features make applying a contractual paradigm to corporate forum-terms 
vulnerable to two significant challenges. 
First, corporate charters and bylaws involve a type of consent that often 
is only distantly related to contract principles. Even academic proponents 
of the corporation-as-contract model admit that terms added after the 
purchase of the stock or at some later point are contractually suspect.17 
These so-called mid-stream amendments do not bear a hallmark of 
consent equivalent to ordinary contracts. The absence of consent raises 
familiar questions about the fairness of compelling adherence to terms that 
do not reflect agreement or preference. 
Second, corporate charters and bylaws involve the state in ways that 
are at odds with private-ordering principles. State judicial decisions 
routinely call the state a party to the corporate “contract” of a domestic 
corporation.18 But the state reserves rights that typically are not a part of 
an ordinary contract—above all, the unilateral right to enact laws that 
retroactively modify or render invalid aspects of the corporate-governance 
structure. States, however, operate under legal constraints that do not 
apply to private actors. These constraints are particularly pronounced in 
the context of laws that restrict access to courts or disfavor the interests of 
other states. Thus, the Constitution generally does not permit a state to 
adopt a “forum-selection” statute that eliminates a party’s right to sue in 
the courts of a sister state or in federal court. Should the notionally private 
corporate “contract” be subject to these constraints imposed on the state 
because the state is considered to be a party to the contract?19 Conversely, 
should the intermediary of the “corporate contract” permit the state to 
achieve indirectly goals that it could not achieve directly because of 
constitutional limits on government power? 
These questions have current importance. Delaware, the state in the 
forefront of corporate law in the United States, amended its law in 2015 
to authorize companies to adopt an exclusive forum for corporate 
litigation through a charter or bylaw provision, provided that Delaware is 
                                                     
17. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1442–44; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822 (1989) (arguing the contractual view of corporation offers strong reasons 
to limit mid-stream amendments). 
18. Infra section II.A. 
19. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison 
Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1576 (2014) (considering whether the fact that the poison pill is a 
private arrangement insulates it from a preemption challenge under the Williams Act, given the extent 
to which state-law rules enable the practice and “are critical to the extent to which the pill empowers 
incumbents to block tender offers”). 
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among the selected fora.20 Corporations, in increasing numbers, have 
adopted such provisions.21 The validity of such a term within Delaware, 
and its enforceability in other states, go to core matters of judicial 
federalism and corporate governance. 
Moreover, even if corporate forum-terms can be justified, corporations 
have started to use the contractual paradigm to adopt provisions that have 
farther reaching effects on jurisdictional doctrine and so on the scope of 
due process protections. In particular, many Delaware corporations have 
begun to include shareholder deemed-consent provisions in their charters 
and bylaws that postulate that a shareholder who bought stock after the 
term was added shall be “deemed” to have “consented” to personal 
jurisdiction in Delaware to enforce the forum-selection term if that 
shareholder files an action in a different court.22 In our view, a state could 
not mandate such a result, but it is a result that very quickly could become 
entrenched through the reflexive—and, in our view, inappropriate—
application of the contractual approach. 
Although the contractual paradigm is not a sufficient basis for the 
blanket enforcement of corporate forum-terms, we recognize that, in some 
situations, corporate forum-terms may be beneficial. Arguably, their 
emergence in corporate practice is part of a strategy to curb abuses in 
representative litigation, with the Delaware judiciary as chief designer of 
that strategy. Delaware judges have commenced a crack-down on 
settlements in corporate disputes that addresses the dual problem of 
settlements with high attorneys’ fees and minimal recovery, coupled with 
broad releases that may bar claims before they have been sufficiently 
investigated.23 Centralizing intra-corporate disputes involving Delaware 
corporations—as is achieved through corporate forum-terms—may be 
necessary to assure that Delaware’s strategy is not undermined by other 
state courts. Viewed in this light, corporate forum-terms serve to limit the 
adverse effects of such litigation on both the parties and the public. These 
                                                     
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017). 
21. Infra note 44. 
22. See, e.g., ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC., BY-LAWS OF ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. (FORM 
8-K, EX. 3.1), art. XI, at 35 (2016) (“If any action the subject matter of which is within the scope of 
the preceding sentence is filed in a court other than a court located within the State of Delaware (a 
“Foreign Action”) in the name of any shareowner, such shareowner will be deemed to have consented 
to (x) the personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located within the State of Delaware in 
connection with any action brought in any such court to enforce the preceding sentence and (y) having 
service of process made upon such shareowner in any such action by service upon such shareowner’s 
counsel in the Foreign Action as agent for such shareowner.”) [hereinafter ROCKWELL 
AUTOMATION]. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 173–82. 
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benefits may be lost, or at the least obscured, if the validity and 
enforceability of corporate forum-terms turn exclusively on the 
touchstone of party consent within a contractual paradigm. 
The Article is organized as follows. In Part I we briefly rehearse the 
emergent practice of director-initiated forum-selection provisions in a 
corporation’s charter or bylaws. Specifically, we examine the case law 
and Delaware’s 2015 amendment to its incorporation law that together 
regulate the validity of forum-selection terms in a corporate charter or 
bylaw in Delaware corporations.24 So far, courts largely have accorded 
corporate forum-terms the same presumption of validity and 
enforceability given to forum-terms in ordinary contracts. 
Part II examines two features of corporate forum-terms that distinguish 
them from the ordinary contractual provisions that have dominated the 
literature on customized procedure. These two distinguishing features are 
the state’s participation in the contractual relation and the limited form of 
consent given by shareholders to the forum-term. Given the state’s 
unusual role in corporate charters and bylaws, we do not view the quasi-
assent supplied by the shareholders’ voluntary decision to invest in a 
company as a sufficient ground for treating a charter or bylaw forum-term 
as valid. However, we do not see the absence of full shareholder consent 
as sufficient for treating the forum-term as unenforceable. Rather, we 
argue that the court’s approach must account for the hybrid nature of such 
terms—public and private—when they appear in a corporation’s 
constitutive documents. 
In Part III, we explore the implications of our analysis for adjudicative 
practice, looking at questions that are important to the next stage of 
discussion about corporate forum-terms. First, we argue that given the 
state’s role in the corporate “contract,” certain forum-terms ought to be 
invalid and unenforceable. Second, we explain why consent ought not to 
be the touchstone of the validity of a corporate forum-term or of its 
enforceability. Third, we show how our approach to corporate forum-
terms differs from current doctrine with respect to ordinary contractual 
forum-terms in the context of a motion to transfer or to dismiss on the 
ground of forum non conveniens. 
The Conclusion moves beyond adjudicative practice and considers 
corporate forum-terms in relation to broader questions of corporate 
regulation, assessing their likely impact upon interstate competition for 
incorporation and for corporate litigation. We argue that to the extent a 
state’s motivation for adopting forum-term legislation that discriminates 
                                                     
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115. 
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against out-of-state courts was to benefit the local bar, the legislation 
presents grounds for sister states to refuse to enforce the forum-term. 
I.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ENABLING OF BYLAW       
 FORUM-TERMS 
Until 2010, most charters and bylaws of publicly-traded corporations 
did not include any forum-terms.25 Delaware, where most companies are 
incorporated, did not expressly authorize the adoption of forum-choice 
provisions in these documents and commentators disagreed whether such 
a provision, if adopted, would be valid.26 
The use of corporate forum-terms started to gain popularity after 
Delaware’s Vice-Chancellor Laster remarked, in a 2010 opinion,27 that 
companies could use exclusive forum charter provisions as protection 
against multiforum litigation.28 The suggestion coincided with an uptick 
in shareholder suits involving claims based on Delaware law being filed 
in courts outside of Delaware—dubbed the “Anywhere but Chancery” 
phenomenon29—and viewed in many quarters as a threat to the status of 
the Delaware Chancery Court as “the Mother Court of corporate law.”30 
Then, in 2013 and 2014, two separate Chancery Court opinions—
Boilermakers31 and City of Providence32—held that even bylaw provisions 
                                                     
25. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336 (2012) (reporting that prior to 2010, 
forum-terms appeared in the charters or bylaws of only sixteen publicly traded companies). 
26. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 
11 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463314 [https://perma.cc/UNL3-V879] (discussing “unsettled 
state of the law” and likelihood that bylaw provisions would be challenged as invalid). 
27. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Laster, V.C.) 
(postulating that “if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide 
an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond 
with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes”).  
28. See generally Thomas T. McClendon, The Power of a Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection 
Clauses by Delaware Corporations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067 (2012); Michael Van Gorder, 
Boilermakers v. Chevron: Are Board Adopted Arbitration Bylaws Valid under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 443, 444 (2014) (“Dicta within a 2010 opinion of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery. . . seemed to provide approval of forum selection clauses within a 
corporation’s governing documents.”).  
29. See generally Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the 
“Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199 (2008). 
30. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1346 & n.3 (2012) (citing 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
31. Boilmakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
32. City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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designating Delaware courts, or courts of another state, as exclusive fora 
were facially valid.33 
To add a forum-term in a charter (a.k.a. certificate of incorporation), as 
Vice-Chancellor Laster suggested, a majority of shareholders would have 
to vote in favor of such a provision.34 To add a forum-term to a bylaw, by 
contrast, shareholder approval generally is not required. Rather, in most 
companies, the board of directors can approve bylaw amendments.35 
In 2015, the Delaware legislature stepped in and added a provision to 
the state’s corporate code—Section 115—to make clear that either the 
charter or the bylaws of a Delaware corporation may include a forum-
selection provision for “internal corporate claims,” defined to include 
claims “based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director 
or officer or stockholder in such capacity” or as to which the Delaware 
General Corporation Law “confers jurisdiction upon the Court of 
Chancery.”36 Such a term may designate “any or all of the courts in this 
State,” but it may not “prohibit bringing such claims in the courts” of 
Delaware.37 In effect, Section 115 codified the 2013 decision permitting 
bylaw provisions to designate Delaware courts as the exclusive fora. But 
it overruled the 2014 decision permitting the provision to designate 
another state’s court as an exclusive forum. Connecticut,38 Indiana,39 New 
                                                     
33. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954 (Strine, C.); City of Providence, 99 A.3d at 240 (Bouchard, C.) 
(“I do not discern an overarching public policy of this State that prevents boards of directors of 
Delaware corporations from adopting bylaws to require stockholders to litigate intra-corporate 
disputes in a foreign jurisdiction.”); see also Choupak v. Rivkin, No. CV 7000-VCL, 2015 WL 
1589610, at *19 n.3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2015), judgment entered (Del. Ch. May 12, 2015), and aff’d 
129 A.3d 232 (2015).  
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2017). 
35. Id. § 109(a). 
36. Id. § 115. 
37. Id. (effectively overruling City of Providence, 99 A.3d at 229, except with respect to 
stockholders agreement or agreement signed by stockholder).  
38. Act effective Oct. 1, 2017, Pub. Act. No. 17-108, 2017 Conn. Pub. Acts 108. 
39. IND. CODE § 23-1-22-2(16) (2017) (permitting designation of Indiana state or federal courts as 
exclusive fora for certain disputes in company’s charter or bylaws).  
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Jersey,40 North Carolina,41 Oklahoma,42 Virginia,43 and Washington44 
have adopted similar provisions. 
In the wake of these developments, an increasing number of Delaware 
firms, as well as multiple non-Delaware firms, have adopted corporate 
forum-terms.45 As of mid-2014, the most recent date for which data are 
available, the number of U.S. public corporations that had adopted such 
provisions stood at 746.46 Since then, that number is likely to have grown 
substantially. 
Forum-terms have two principal structural components. First, the terms 
designate a court as an exclusive forum, unless the corporation consents 
to a different forum. Delaware companies generally split in selecting just 
the Delaware Chancery Court as the exclusive forum or also including 
other Delaware state courts and the Delaware federal district court;47 non-
Delaware companies generally have designated both their local state court 
and the federal court in that state as fora.48 
Second, the terms specify the claims that can be litigated only in the 
selected forum. Not surprisingly, the terms channel “internal affairs” to 
the selected forum. However, some terms arguably go beyond that 
category. For example, some terms include actions “asserting a claim of 
breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee 
of the Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s 
                                                     
40. Act of Jan. 16, 2018, ch. 356, 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (West). 
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-50 (2017). 
42. Act of May 22, 2017, ch. 323, § 3, 2017 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 18, § 1014.2). 
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-624 (2017) (permitting designation of Virginia courts or courts in state 
of company’s principal office as exclusive fora for certain disputes). 
44. Act of Apr. 17, 2017, ch. 28, § 9, 2017 Wash. Legis. Serv. 96 (to be codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 23B.02).  
45. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS, DIR. NOTES, CONF. BOARD 
GOVERNANCE CTR. (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715 [https:// 
perma.cc/U62K-WRRA] (listing companies); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private 
Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 21362, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21362 [https://perma.cc/56MQ-BKYV].  
46. Romano & Sanga, supra note 45, at 2. 
47. ALLEN, supra note 45, at 4 (reporting that, post-Boilermakers, 43% of terms selected the 
Chancery Court as exclusive forum, 23% selected the state and federal courts in Delaware, and 34% 
selected the Delaware Chancery or state courts and the Delaware federal court only if the state court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction).  
48. See, e.g., BYLAWS OF NORDSTROM, INC., art. II, § 14 (Amended and Restated as of June 7, 
2017) (designating state and federal courts in King County, Washington as exclusive fora); BYLAWS 
OF SKYLINE CORP., art. VIII, § 2 (Amended and Restated as of June 1, 2017) (designating state and 
federal courts in Elkhart County, Indiana as exclusive fora). 
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shareowners,”49 which would seem to embrace insider trading claims.50 
Other terms refer to any actions “based upon a violation of a duty by a 
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity,”51 
which may include a host of non-internal affairs claims (for example, 
employment discrimination claims). 
Beyond the forum selected and the claims covered, some terms set 
conditions on when the selected forum must be used. For example, some 
terms condition use of the selected forum on its having subject-matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over indispensable parties. Other 
terms attempt to insulate the selected forum from challenge by deeming 
any shareholders who acquire stock after the provision was adopted to 
have consented to personal jurisdiction in the selected-forum court in a 
proceeding brought to enforce the exclusive forum-term.52 
The Delaware courts that have considered challenges to corporate 
forum-terms have looked at the question in the context of bylaw forum-
terms. These courts have reasoned that corporate bylaws are contracts. 
Thus, the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2013 decision in Boilermakers 
notes that the bylaw provision providing for Delaware as a forum for 
litigating internal affairs disputes is a “valid and enforceable contractual 
forum selection [provision]”;53 that “bylaws . . . constitute part of a 
binding broader contract”;54 and that forum-selection provisions in 
bylaws are “enforceable under Delaware law to the same extent as other 
contractual forum selection clauses.”55 City of Providence—the 2014 
Chancery decision which upheld a bylaw provision opting for North 
Carolina as the exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes of a Delaware 
corporation—likewise contains extensive references to this contractual 
rationale.56 
                                                     
49. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, supra note 22, art. XI, at 35. 
50. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (premising insider trading liability on the breach of 
a fiduciary or similar duty). 
51. See COLUCID PHARMACEUTICALS INC., FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF 
INCORPORATION OF COLUCID PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (FORM 8-K, Ex. 3.1), art. 10.1 (2015). 
52. See ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, supra note 22, art. XI, at 35; Allen, supra note 45, at 5. 
53. Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
54. Id. (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at 940 (emphasis added). Boilermakers emphasized that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
approach to contractual forum-selection terms, which Delaware has adopted as a matter of state law, 
a forum-term is not valid if it is unreasonable. See also Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143 (Del. 
2010) (relying on M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 1 (1972)). 
56. See, e.g., City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 233 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (“[B]ylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the 
directors, officers, and stockholders.”) (citations omitted).  
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Delaware’s view of the validity of a bylaw forum-term is important 
because the law of the state of incorporation will determine the validity of 
a corporate forum-term as a matter of corporate law. Because the content 
of a charter or bylaw is, in the first instance, an issue of the corporation’s 
“internal affairs,” the validity of a forum term under the corporate law of 
the company’s state of incorporation is a prerequisite to its enforceability. 
Delaware now treats a corporate forum-term as a valid clause, subject to 
an as-applied challenge for breach of fiduciary duty or other unfairness. 
However, whatever Delaware’s view of the validity of a corporate 
forum-term of a Delaware corporation (or a sister state’s view in a 
comparable circumstance), the decision to have litigation proceed in a 
forum not selected in the forum-term generally will be made by a court in 
a state that was not selected by that clause. The handful of courts that have 
considered the enforceability of a bylaw forum-term when suit has been 
filed in a non-selected forum have applied forum law, not Delaware law, 
to decide the question. For the most part, these courts have accepted the 
contractual rationale articulated by Boilermakers.57 The only court so far 
to have refused to enforce a forum-term is the California federal district 
court in Galaviz v. Berg,58 which held that a forum-term unilaterally 
adopted by the board mid-stream “after the majority of the purported 
wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred” was unenforceable because it 
lacked any showing “of mutual consent” to the choice of forum.59 
                                                     
57. E.g., Billard v. Angrick, 220 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.D.C. 2016) (granting motion to dismiss suit 
on forum non conveniens grounds because bylaw designated the Delaware Chancery Court as 
exclusive forum); In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. CV14-6414-GHK, 2015 WL 
9871275 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (same); Butorin ex rel. KBR Inc. v. Blout, 106 F. Supp. 3d 833 
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (holding bylaw designating Delaware courts enforceable and transferring case to 
U.S. District Court for District of Delaware); North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 642 (S.D. 
Ohio 2014) (citing Melissa’s Trust v. Seton, No. 14 C 02068, 2014 WL 3811241, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 
31, 2014)); Groen v. Safeway, Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752 (Cal. Super. May 14, 2014) 
(looking to Boilermakers as source for general contractual principles); Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 38–47, Miller v. Beam, Inc., No. 2014-CH-00932, 2014 WL 8664334 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2014); 
Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, 2014 WL 9913855, slip op. at *22–26 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 19, 2014); Genoud v. Edgen Grp., Inc., No. 625,244, 2014 WL 2782221, slip. op. (La. Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014); HEMG Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, slip op. (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013). 
58. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (as matter of first impression, corporation could not 
dismiss action for lack of venue based on forum-term in bylaw). 
59. Id. at 1173–74. A later federal court punted on the question, finding that the challenged forum-
term had not yet become effective. In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 922 F. Supp. 
2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An Oregon state court declined to enforce a Delaware bylaw term, 
adopted two days before a merger announcement, finding that it violated a state policy against 
enforcing contracts that lack “mutual assent.” Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductors, Inc., No. 1402-
02441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *4 (Or. Cir. Aug. 14, 2014). But the Oregon Supreme Court, en banc, 
entered mandamus relief finding no such compelling policy under state law. Roberts v. TriQuint 
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II.  RESISTING THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO CHARTER 
AND BYLAW FORUM-TERMS 
In our view, the validity and enforceability of the corporate forum-term 
ought not to be treated as a matter of ordinary contract law. Corporate 
forum-terms differ significantly from ordinary contracts, and invoking the 
contract rationale obfuscates the underlying considerations that bear on 
terms of this sort.60 In this Part, we explain our skepticism about applying 
ordinary contract principles in assessing the validity and enforceability of 
forum-terms in corporate charters and bylaws. First, we show why the 
state’s role as a party to the corporate “contract” cuts against having a 
court treat a charter or bylaw forum-term as an ordinary contract when the 
issue arises in litigation. Second, we take the contract argument on its own 
terms, discussing whether a charter and bylaw forum-term manifests the 
requisite degree of assent needed to validate a contact. 
A.  The State as Party to the Corporate “Contract” 
The contractual approach to corporate forum-terms treats the 
corporation’s constitutive documents—its charter and bylaws—as 
contracts. Contractual parties may agree to waive access to a federal 
forum, to designate venue in a particular state court, and to give up rights 
to damages or to jury trials. Under the contractual approach, these terms 
carry a presumption of respect—and are not subject to certain 
constitutional limitations—because they are the product of a private 
arrangement in which parties consented to modify their entitlements. 
A corporation’s charter and bylaws, however, are no ordinary 
contracts. They are instead a hybrid between an ordinary contract and state 
law—they are highly regulated constitutive documents that order 
collective decision-making.61 Both formally and functionally, corporate 
law conceives of the state as an integral party to the corporate “contract,” 
                                                     
Semiconductors, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Or. 2015). See Eleanor J. Vincent, Note, The Implications of 
Oregon’s TriQuint Decision for Enforcing Forum Selection Bylaws, 94 OR. L. REV. 223, 225 (2015) 
(criticizing TriQuint and discussing “strong policy considerations” in favor of enforcing corporate 
forum-terms of “consistency, efficiency, and judicial expertise”). 
60. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
257, 259 (2015) (arguing that contract law principles do “not support the results reached in 
Boilermakers”); Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in 
M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1953–56 (2013) (expressing skepticism about the 
enforceability of forum selection bylaws as contracts). 
61. The literature is canonical and voluminous. See, e.g., Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Corporate 
Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1957); Louis L. Jaffe, 
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937). 
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and assigns powers to the state that are not typical of parties to ordinary 
contracts. 
Consider, first, the formal argument about state involvement in the 
corporate “contract.” Delaware courts routinely describe the corporation 
as a contract between the firm and the state,62 a view that is shared by 
other state courts and federal courts.63 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has referred to the conception of the corporation as a “contract 
between the State and the corporation, and the corporation and its 
shareholders” as one of “many interacting principles of established law.”64 
A corollary is that every corporate charter and bylaw “impliedly” includes 
state law as a provision,65 and that the state, as a party to the charter, 
reserves the right to change its terms by amending or repealing its laws. 
Delaware law often is described in facilitative terms: the state’s 
corporate law merely “enable[s]” private parties to incorporate “on terms 
which they freely choose.”66 But this statement is only half true. While 
corporate laws afford corporations significant choice in devising charter 
and bylaw terms, they also impose significant constraints.67 Above all, 
charters and bylaws may contain provisions dealing only with a limited 
set of subjects—some specifically identified, such as whether directors 
                                                     
62. Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. Ch. 1930); see also Garry D. Hartlieb, 
Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses for Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, 4 MICH. 
BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 131, 140 & n.54 (2014) (“a corporation’s governance documents 
are ‘a contract between the State and the corporation, and the corporation and its shareholders’”) 
(citing Lawson, 152 A. at 727).  
63. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429 (1934); Avondale Land 
Co. v. Shook, 54 So. 268, 269 (Ala. 1911); Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 
849, 852 (Fla. 1971); S. W. R. Co. v. Benton, 58 S.E.2d 905, 917 (Ga. 1950); Pac. Intermountain Exp. 
Co. v. Best Truck Lines, Inc., 518 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State ex rel. Swanson v. 
Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368, 374, 191 P.2d 689, 693 (1948); see also 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 64 
(2017). 
64. STARR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. Ch. 1991). See Wylain, Inc. v. 
TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 1979) (“[T]he corporate charter, (1) is a contract between 
the state and the corporation; (2) is a contract between the corporation and its stockholders; and (3) is 
a contract between the stockholders inter se.” (citations omitted)).  
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (2017) (“This chapter and all amendments thereof shall be a part 
of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation.”). See also Hartford Acc. & Indem. 
Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 24 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. Ch. 1942) (“[T]here is impliedly written 
into every corporate charter as a constituent part thereof the pertinent provisions of the State 
Constitution and statutes.”). 
66. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 252 (1977).  
67. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An 
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Cox, supra note 60, at 278–84 (arguing 
that restrictions on private ordering imposed by corporate law conflict with nexus-of-contracts 
paradigm). 
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can be removed without cause, and others generically identified, such as 
“any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of 
the affairs of the corporation.”68 Within the set of permissible subjects, the 
content of a charter or bylaw provision often is constrained—for example, 
in Delaware, a charter cannot provide that directors of a corporation with 
a non-classified board can be removed only for cause.69 Likewise, state 
law highly regulates the mode by which charters and bylaws may be 
amended. Thus, any charter amendment in Delaware requires an 
affirmative recommendation by the board of directors and the approval by 
at least a majority of shares entitled to vote.70 
Section 115 illustrates both the enabling elements and the presence of 
constraints. A corporation may choose whether to include a forum-term 
in its charter or bylaws. But the scope of permissible terms is limited: no 
forum-term may oust Delaware as a forum.71 
Second, at the functional level, the Boilermakers court referred to the 
relationship between the directors and shareholders as a “flexible” 
contract.72 This characterization is consistent with treating the state as a 
third party to a corporate “contract” in light of its role in revising, adding, 
and eliminating terms from the corporation’s charter and bylaws. Indeed, 
an influential characterization of the corporation as a long-term relational 
contract emphasizes the fact that the “contract” delegates authority to 
revise contractual terms on an on-going basis to one party—the state—
which serves as a “third-party contracting agent for corporate investors 
and managers”73 and can “[t]hrough statutory amendments or judicial 
decisions . . . in effect, alter the corporate charter when the need arises.”74 
Corporations are said to have an incentive to defer to terms that are 
provided by statute or decisional law because participating public 
                                                     
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1). 
69. Id. § 141(k). 
70. Id. § 251. A charter may not relax the shareholder voting requirements supplied by state law. 
Id. § 102(b)(4). 
71. Id. § 115. 
72. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) (calling 
corporate bylaws “part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders 
formed within the statutory framework of the [Delaware General Corporate Law]” and stating that 
the contract “is, by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the DGCL spells out”). 
For a criticism of validating forum-terms on the basis of a flexible contract that fails to manifest true 
shareholder consent, see Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency 
Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269 (2015). 
73. Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1, 14 (2006). 
74. Id. at 9. 
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institutions—the legislature and the courts—are regarded as “relatively 
durable and trustworthy third parties.”75 
Section 115 and the earlier court decisions validating corporate forum-
terms conform to this identified pattern. They grant boards the power 
(perhaps new, perhaps always present but previously not recognized) to 
include a forum-selection clause in either the corporate charter or the 
bylaws. These powers presumably have become more desirable due to the 
growth of multi-forum litigation. Thus, the fact that state law has changed 
or clarified the board’s power, coupled with the board’s increased 
“private” decision to exercise such power, reflect the “flexible” nature of 
the corporate contract and the state’s involvement in it. 
In sum, the state plays an unusual and large role in the “contractual” 
regime constituted by charters, bylaws, and state law. State law, in 
particular statutory law, extensively regulates the permitted content of 
charters and bylaws; state law continuously revises and adds terms—opt-
in provisions, opt-out provisions, and, less commonly, mandatory 
provisions—to the charters and bylaws; state corporate law is conceived 
as implied provisions of the “corporate contract”; the state itself is 
conceived as a notional party to that contract; and, most tellingly, the state 
reserves the right to change charter and bylaw terms ex post—by adopting 
laws making such terms invalid—without running afoul of the Contracts 
Clause.76 This degree of state involvement, and the state’s retention of the 
power to revise charter terms ex post, cannot be reconciled with the 
ordinary principles of contract law that have been applied to conventional 
forum-terms outside the context of charters and bylaws. 
B.  Corporate Bylaws, “Contracts,” and the Myth of Shareholder 
Consent 
So far we have argued that the state’s participation in the corporate 
“contract” argues against treating a corporate charter or bylaw as an 
ordinary contract when it regulates access to the courts. Now we consider 
the charter/bylaw-as-contract argument on its own terms. Contractual 
forum-terms arguably differ from legislative venue rules not simply 
because of the level of state involvement, but also because parties to a 
contract typically are assumed to have given consent to the term—thus 
                                                     
75. Id. at 15. 
76. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 589–91 (1819) (holding that 
corporate charter is a contract between the state and the person to whom the charter is granted within 
the meaning of the Contracts Clause). See Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations 
and Vested Rights, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 129, 132 (1922) (explaining that the state’s use of a “reserved 
power clause” avoids the effect of the Dartmouth College rule). 
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volitionally giving up important interests, including waiving the right to 
commence a suit other than in the selected forum or to transfer the suit 
from the designated forum.77 
The general rule is that a court ought to enforce a contract because the 
parties have agreed to its terms.78 Party consent is the touchstone of 
contractual validity, and respecting the parties’ consent through 
contractual enforcement reinforces notions of autonomy, encourages 
innovation, and promotes efficiency. However, these standard principles 
suffer serious distortion when applied to corporate forum-terms.79 
To start, who are the parties who have consented to the corporate 
“contract?” Delaware courts have waffled in their response to this 
question. Boilermakers, for example, stated that “the bylaws of a 
Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among 
the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory 
framework.”80 Other cases and passages refer to these documents as 
contracts “among a corporation’s shareholders,”81 as contracts “both 
between the corporation and the state and the corporation and its 
stockholders,”82 as contracts “between the stockholders, the directors and 
officers, and the corporation” or as contracts “between corporations and 
stockholders.”83 
Corporate forum-terms, however, encompass claims brought by 
persons who are not mentioned in any of these formulations—persons 
whom not even Delaware seems to regard as parties to the corporate 
“contract.” To take one example, creditors of insolvent corporations, 
including involuntary creditors such as tort victims, can assert claims of 
                                                     
77. E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 165–66 (2015) 
(defending validity of bylaw forum-term through a “doctrine of corporate consent”). 
78. Omri Ben-Shachar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual 
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2004) (“One of the pillars of the law of contract formation 
is the principle of mutual assent.”). 
79. Our argument that charters and bylaws lack the degree of consent found in ordinary contracts 
does not imply that these governance documents should not be treated as analogous to contracts in 
certain respects. Thus, it may make sense, as held by the Delaware Supreme Court, to apply principles 
of contract interpretation to the interpretation of ambiguous charter provisions. Airgas, Inc. v. Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010). What is significant is determining when and 
why the contractual paradigm should dominate and when it should not. 
80. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
81. Airgas, 8 A.3d at 1188. See also Patrick J. Rohl, The Reassertion of the Primacy of Delaware 
and Forum Selection Bylaws, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 143, 145, 145 n.19 (2015) (citing Airgas 
for the proposition that Delaware courts apply non-contractual principles to questions “that arise out 
of the role of shareholders in the governance process”).  
82. Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del. 1930). 
83. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 940, 949. 
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breach of corporate fiduciary duties that are clearly within the scope of 
Section 115.84 Similarly, various market participants, such as bondholders 
or option holders, have standing to assert claims arising under the federal 
securities laws.85 Claims that the CEO engaged in insider trading or 
fraudulently certified a securities filing as accurate also appear to fall 
within the scope of forum-terms that encompass claims “based upon a 
violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder 
in such capacity.”86 Indeed, even claims that an officer engaged in 
employment discrimination arguably fall within the scope of Section 115. 
What about shareholders—the core plaintiffs meant to be bound by 
corporate forum-terms and clearly parties to the charter/bylaw “contract?” 
The notion that the shareholders have consented to a forum-term often is 
no more than a fiction. The strongest case for consent arises when 
shareholders bought shares from the corporation, for example at an initial 
public offering (IPO), and the company’s charter or bylaw at that time 
already included a forum-term.87 In this situation, the degree of the 
shareholder consent resembles that of a party who has “accepted” a term 
embedded in a non-negotiable contract: the shareholder will have had 
either actual knowledge of the forum-term or, at the least, an opportunity 
to have learned about its existence before making the investment decision. 
However, this form of consent is lacking when the company adds the 
forum-term mid-stream, after the company has sold shares.88 Indeed, any 
shareholder who did not vote in favor of the mid-stream amendment did 
not consent at all to the forum-selection provision. At most, such a 
shareholder consented to the rules for changing charter or bylaw terms (to 
the extent these rules were established when the company initially sold 
the shares). 
The Delaware Chancery Court in Boilermakers relied upon this notion 
of consent—consent to the rules for making changes, albeit not to the 
                                                     
84. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) 
(creditors of insolvent corporations have standing to assert derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims). 
85. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750–51 (1975). 
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017). 
87. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1825–29 (distinguishing between charter terms added mid-
stream and terms present at the IPO). 
88. See Hamermesh, supra note 77, at 169. The relevant issue is when the company sold the shares 
to shareholders, not when a particular shareholder bought shares in the secondary market. A secondary 
market buyer stands in the shoes of the secondary market seller and should have the same rights. So, 
to the extent the secondary market seller “consented” to a forum-selection term, by voting in favor or 
by buying from the company with actual or presumed knowledge of the presence of the term, that 
consent can be imputed to the secondary market buyer. But if the provision was added mid-stream 
without the vote of the secondary market seller, and the secondary market seller hence did not 
“consent,” this lack of consent should also be imputed to the buyer, even if the buyer may have been 
aware of the provisions at the time of the investment decision. 
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changes themselves—to justify treating bylaws as contracts for purposes 
of assessing forum-terms. According to Boilermakers, the contract 
embodied in the bylaws 
is, by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the 
[Delaware General Corporation Law] spells out and that investors 
know about when they purchase stock in a Delaware 
corporation. . . . Thus, when investors bought stock [in the 
companies that had adopted forum selection bylaws], they knew 
(i) that . . . the certificates of incorporation gave the boards the 
power to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally; (ii) that . . . 
bylaws [could] regulate the business of the corporation, the 
conduct of its affairs, and the rights or powers of its stockholders; 
and (iii) that board-adopted bylaws are binding on the 
stockholders. In other words, an essential part of the contract 
stockholders assent to when they buy stock in Chevron and FedEx 
is one that presupposes the board’s authority to adopt binding 
bylaws . . . .89 
But, for one, this rationale proves too much. When investors buy stock, 
they also know that the rules of corporate governance (including the rules 
on how the rules can be changed) can be changed by legislation. Thus, 
“an essential part of the [arrangement] that shareholders assent to when 
they buy stock”—to paraphrase Boilermakers—“presupposes” the 
legislature’s “authority to adopt binding” corporate laws.90 Under the 
Boilermakers rationale, therefore, a Delaware statute that conferred 
exclusive jurisdiction over “internal corporate claims” should likewise be 
treated as a contract for purposes of assessing forum-terms. Such a statute, 
however, would almost certainly violate the recognized limits to the 
power of the state to regulate judicial access and be invalid. As a matter 
of logic, therefore, the rationale in Boilermakers is fallacious. 
Moreover, consent to process is not the equivalent to consent to the 
substantive output of that process.91 Whether and when to enforce a term 
consenting to process is a contested notion in procedural doctrine and 
democratic theory.92 Simply put, having bought shares with knowledge of 
                                                     
89. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
90. Id. at 940.  
91. See Ben Walther, Bylaw Governance, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 428 (2015) 
(distinguishing between changes to the “rules of the game” and decisions “that occur during the game 
itself”) (citing Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005)). 
92. The best-known discussion in democratic theory, that consent to majoritarian decision-making 
is not the same as consent to the substantive outputs of majoritarian process in all cases, remains that 
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how the rules can be changed does not amount to having consented to the 
changes themselves and does not generate the same presumption of 
consent as having signed a contract that already contains the new rules.93 
Though consent to process is never equivalent to consent to output, 
several factors bear on the degree of the gap. As mentioned, amendments 
to corporate charters generally require the approval of shareholders.94 To 
the extent that the shareholders who approved an amendment adding a 
forum-term have the same interest as those who did not, majority approval 
provides a form of virtual consent by shareholders as a whole to that 
provision (and actual consent by the shareholders who voted for it). 
Especially in the case of representative actions brought on behalf of all 
shareholders as a class, the fact that a majority of shareholders (or their 
successors in interest) approved a charter amendment adding an exclusive 
forum provision provides a strong basis for enforcement. 
Bylaw amendments adopted by the board without a shareholder vote, 
however, raise more severe concerns. While shareholders are the most 
likely plaintiffs in a suit subject to the forum-term, directors are the most 
likely defendants in such a suit. Any procedural device applicable to 
lawsuits by a shareholder against directors inherently raises potential 
conflicts of interest (potential because a shareholder-plaintiff may not 
represent the interest of shareholders as a whole). When the interests of 
shareholders and directors conflict, the board’s approval of a bylaw does 
not amount even to virtual consent for there is no legitimate representative 
proxy.95 Similarly, when the interests of shareholders conflict—for 
example, in a firm with a controlling shareholder—approval of a charter 
                                                     
of JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981). On the 
“deeply problematic” nature of process-based constitutional theory, see Laurence H. Tribe, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1080 (1980). For 
a discussion of the serious concerns raised by contractarian theories of fair process, see Robert G. 
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 
83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003). For an article supporting the broad use of contract procedure in corporate 
organizational documents, see Winship, supra note 14, at 531–32. 
93. Consumer contracts increasingly have included terms allowing the seller or creditor a unilateral 
right to modify the contract. Frequently, but not always, these change-terms allow a modification of 
procedural rights that the consumer would have—for example, to file suit in court or to join in a class 
action. In some of these settings, the contract at the time of formation has granted one party the 
unilateral right to change a contract term. Unilateral modification rights in actual contracts raise issues 
of consent that are similar to those we address in this article. 
94. See supra notes 34–35.  
95. The contractual analogue of permitting the board to change the bylaws unilaterally has been 
dubbed “empty promises” by one influential commentary. Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty 
Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“The public outrage is justified. Empty promises are prone 
to abuse and should not be offered in the guise of real promises.”).  
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amendment through a majority vote reflects no meaningful consent to 
output by dissenting minority shareholders. 
We recognize that shareholders are not necessarily helpless even when 
a bylaw forum-term can be adopted without shareholder approval. 
Shareholders in publicly traded corporations who oppose such a forum-
term could file a precatory shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 
requesting that the board repeal the bylaw.96 Although such a resolution 
is not binding, boards increasingly have implemented resolutions that 
have obtained majority support.97 They also could show their displeasure 
by casting “withhold” votes in the election of directors (depending on the 
applicable voting rule and number of withhold votes, the effect of such 
votes ranges from embarrassment to non-election of a nominee to the 
board).98 To the extent that shareholders have the realistic opportunity to 
take these steps and fail to do so,99 they could be viewed as having at least 
passively acquiesced in the board’s action. 
A final potentially ameliorating factor is that, at least in Delaware, 
fiduciary duties limit the ability of the board to amend bylaws.100 
Delaware courts have held that, even though the board had the formal 
power to amend the bylaws, bylaw amendments that advanced the date of 
a shareholder meeting thereby inhibiting the ability of dissidents to mount 
a challenge or that expanded the board size and filled the vacancy thereby 
preempting a shareholder attempt to expand the board size and fill 
vacancies with shareholder nominees were not valid.101 Fiduciary duties 
thus may impose some loosely-defined constraint on the bylaw 
amendments that are adverse to the interest of shareholders and beneficial 
                                                     
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
97. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1011–13 (2010) 
(implementation rate increased from 12% in 2001 to 50% in 2008). 
98. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 
EMORY L.J. 869, 888–901 (analyzing factors that contribute to withhold votes). Shareholders could 
also seek to repeal a bylaw provision by a binding shareholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 109(a) (2017); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (distinguishing forum-terms from poison pills). Binding shareholder bylaw amendments, 
however, are extremely rare. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance 
Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2018–21 (2014). 
99. Whether the opportunity is realistic depends on factors such as timing of the adoption of the 
bylaw in relation to the lawsuit, the vote required for shareholders to repeal a bylaw, and the 
shareholder profile. 
100. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954 (“[T]he real-world application of a forum selection bylaw 
can be challenged as an inequitable breach of fiduciary duty.”) (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)). 
101. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (date of shareholder meeting); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 
564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board expansion). 
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to the personal interests of the directors. Indeed, the Delaware cases 
upholding forum-selection clauses, as well as the legislative history to 
Section 115, make clear that, while such clauses are not facially invalid, 
they will not necessarily survive an as-applied challenge: a board may in 
some circumstances breach its duty either by adopting such a clause or by 
failing to waive it.102 
III.  REFRAMING THE DOCTRINE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
CORPORATE FORUM-TERMS 
The U.S. Supreme Court has favored applying a contractual approach 
to forum-terms—but it has done so in cases in which the forum-term 
actually is a part of a contract.103 A charter or bylaw is not an ordinary 
contract. Our argument has emphasized the state’s unusual role as a party 
to the “contract” with revisionary and authorizing power that is not 
typically granted in the ordinary contractual setting. The observation is 
not the general one of legal realism that the state is implicated in all private 
deals;104 the state’s role in corporate charters and bylaws is of a different 
order. Moreover, even if we were to accept charters and bylaws as a form 
of private ordering, the usual contractual rules about consent are difficult 
to apply to forum-terms. In particular, in the common situation of a mid-
stream addition of a forum-term to the bylaws, shareholder consent is at 
most consent to the process of amending bylaws coupled with tacit 
acquiescence in the amendment approved by the board. The Supreme 
Court has not yet endorsed forum-terms as valid where there is no 
showing of consent to the provision. 
In this Part, we consider how the state’s role in the corporate contract 
ought to affect the kinds of forum-terms that permissibly may be included 
in a charter or bylaw. We then take up the question of consent and show 
how a properly conceived approach to corporate forum-terms would 
operate in practice. Through a series of examples, we sketch out the 
factors that ought to inform a court’s assessment, and the differing weights 
that may be required given the facts and circumstances. Our approach 
diverges from the Supreme Court’s treatment of ordinary forum-term 
provisions, but the two methodologies—notwithstanding criticisms of 
                                                     
102. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663. 
103. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 568, 583 (2013); Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 8–10 (1972). 
104. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (“Not only are existing 
laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of 
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.”). 
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current doctrine105—can cohabit without disruption of current jurisdiction 
and venue rules. 
A.  Mandatory Restraints on Corporate Forum-Terms 
States that authorize corporations to adopt forum-terms in their charters 
and bylaws do not mandate their inclusion; state law simply permits the 
firm to adopt the provision if it so chooses. At the same time, state law 
often constrains the firm’s choices by regulating the content of a 
permissible forum-term; for example, if a Delaware company desires an 
exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes, that forum may not exclude 
Delaware. 
A key implication of our analysis is that the state’s role in the corporate 
“contract” ought to bar its authorizing certain kinds of forum-terms in the 
firm’s charter or bylaws. The federal Constitution prevents states from 
restricting judicial access in a number of important ways106: in our view, 
states ought not to be able to achieve an arguably impermissible result 
through the intermediary of private ordering, and particularly in a context 
that not only lacks a showing of strong party consent, but also potentially 
generates negative third party effects. The problem is the inverse of the 
usual private-governance problem when private parties wield quasi-public 
power yet escape public forms of regulation. Rather, the danger is that a 
public entity will be allowed to reach decisions that affect public life, free 
from public limits because filtered through the intermediary of 
“contract.”107 
Given the state’s role in the corporate “contract,” what kinds of forum-
terms ought to be off the table or, at a minimum, subject to close scrutiny? 
First, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a state may not oust 
a federal court of diversity jurisdiction to hear a state cause of action, and 
a corporate charter or bylaw likewise ought not to be able to oust a federal 
court of diversity jurisdiction.108 Railway Co. v. Whitton’s 
                                                     
105. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 541–65 (criticizing the Court’s contractual paradigm 
for ordinary forum terms). 
106. See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 51, 67–77 (2012) (discussing various constitutional limits on state authority to restrict judicial 
access). 
107. See Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 289 (2013) (discussing 
“state action cases in which the complaint is only with the private party’s own conduct, as to which 
there is some reason to think public Constitutional Law is the appropriate governing regime”). 
108. See Recent Cases, Federal Courts—Authority of State Law—Power of a State to Preclude 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1962) (“The Supreme Court has 
consistently struck down attempts to oust federal jurisdiction of general causes of action created by a 
state and cognizable in its courts of general jurisdiction.”). 
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Administrator,109 a chestnut of federal jurisdiction, held that a state cannot 
bar the removal of an action from state to federal court by purporting to 
confer exclusive state jurisdiction over the claim: 
Whenever a general rule as to property or personal rights, or 
injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its 
enforcement by a Federal court in a case between proper parties 
is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction of the court, in such a 
case, is not subject to State limitation.110 
The reason for this restriction draws from the constitutional concerns 
that motivate the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III of the 
Federal Constitution: fear of legislative capture by in-state factions and of 
judicial bias against non-state citizens.111 For similar reasons, a state may 
not bar a litigant from filing or prosecuting an in personam action in a 
federal court within the grant of arising-under jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.112 These concerns do not dissipate when the ouster is done 
through private mechanisms that privilege in-state parties. 
Second, as a matter of Full Faith and Credit,113 a state generally cannot 
discriminate in favor of its own courts to the detriment of the courts of 
sister states.114 A limited exception for public policy is recognized, but 
rarely found in practice.115 Thus, a state could not simply refuse to enforce 
                                                     
109. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872). 
110. Id. at 286. 
111. See Sharon E. Rush, Federalism, Diversity, Equality, and Article III Judges: Geography, 
Identity, and Bias, 79 MO. L. REV. 119, 124 (2014) (“Diversity jurisdiction allows a litigant to escape 
the potential unfair bias in state court by bringing his or her claim in federal court.”). See generally 
Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the “Inside-Outsider,” 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 
(1986).  
112. Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 16 (1977) (“[T]he right to litigate in federal court is 
granted by Congress and, consequently, ‘cannot be taken away by the state.’”) (quoting Donovan v. 
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964)). Of course, the state can define state causes of action, and in that 
way significantly affect whether a claim will fall within the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
114. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 320–21 (1992) (arguing that although the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause creates “the need for a single applicable law, identifiable in advance,” 
“[a] case can be decided by any court that acquires jurisdiction over the defendant . . . .”). A limited 
exception to this principle relates to matrimonial and certain in rem claims. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 
215 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1909) (“[W]here the suit is strictly local, the subject-matter is specific property, 
and the relief, when granted, is such that it must act directly upon the subject-matter, and not upon the 
person of the defendant, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the state where the subject-matter is 
situated.” (citations omitted)). 
115. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935) 
(“One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by 
the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the 
conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows 
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the judgment of another state court.116 Similarly, state statutes generally 
cannot vest exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of a state and deprive sister 
states of jurisdiction.117 As the Supreme Court has explained: 
[A] state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same 
time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in 
any court having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be determined 
by the law of the court’s creation, and cannot be defeated by the 
extraterritorial operation of a statute of another state, even though 
it created the right of action.118 
Under this analysis, the discriminatory feature of most forum-term 
laws—which permit the designation of the state of incorporation’s courts 
as exclusive fora, but not of courts of any other state—at the least raises 
                                                     
that not every statute of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the 
full faith and credit clause; that the statute of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute 
of another, both at home and abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting statutes may each prevail 
over the other at home, although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the other.”). An 
exception is provided for judgments rendered by courts without subject-matter jurisdiction, but a 
judgment is entitled to a presumption of facial validity. See V.L. v. E.L., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1017, 
1020 (2016) (“A State is not required . . . to afford full faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a 
court that ‘did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties.’” (citing 
Underwriters Nat. Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 455 U.S. 691, 
705 (1982))). 
116. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235–36, 238 (1908) (Mississippi could not deny respect to 
Missouri judgment based on gambling transaction on ground that gambling contracts are not to be 
enforced “by any court”); see also Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 
252 U.S. 411, 415 (1920) (holding that Illinois statute prohibiting prosecution of wrongful death 
where death had occurred in another state did not prevent enforcement of Alabama ruling, and 
explaining, “[w]hether the Illinois statute should be construed as the Mississippi Act was construed 
in Fauntleroy v. Lum was for the Supreme Court of the State to decide, but read as that Court read it, 
it attempted to achieve a result that the Constitution of the United States forbade”).  
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (claim-
localizing statutes do not deprive sister states of power to hear claim). 
118. Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914); see Note, Protection for 
Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 
1039 n.64 (1958) (“The various legislatures, in specifying which courts are appropriate within their 
own states, probably are not concerned with and do not intend to affect the bringing of suits in other 
states. Further, even if the statutes are intended to foreclose suit in other states, they may be ineffective 
to do so.”) (citing Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 354). The Tennessee Coal principle was subject to limits 
set out by the decision itself: where “the right and the remedy” are “so inseparably united as to make 
the right dependent upon its being enforced in a particular tribunal,” a forum-state’s jurisdiction may 
be restricted. Tenn. Coal, 233 U.S. at 359. However, in subsequent cases, this aspect of Tennessee 
Coal has been “eroded,” so that “the State of the forum may ‘supplement’ or ‘displace’ the remedy 
of the other State, consistently with constitutional requirements.” Crider v. Zurich Ins., 380 U.S. 39, 
42–43 (1965) (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955)) (citing Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 
at 544). We do not need to identify the precise limits of this principle to make our point: that when it 
comes to jurisdiction and judicial access, states function under different constraints than private 
parties and the use of the corporate form does not dilute or mitigate the concern driving the constraint.  
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constitutional concerns that are not present when private parties agree to 
jurisdiction-limiting terms in a contract. 
Third, a state may not create a property interest and then attach 
procedural limitations to that interest which effectively eliminate legal 
protection.119 Although the principle has unclear boundaries, common 
sense suggests that a forum provision vesting jurisdiction over a claim 
exclusively in a court that either lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or 
lacked personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party—and hence 
would not be able to offer any relief—may amount to an unconstitutional 
denial of due process. 
Fourth, the Dormant Commerce Clause limits a state’s power to 
legislate in ways that discriminate against out-of-state interests, and its 
central target is state protectionist legislation. A state law that facially 
violates this rule is subject to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity”120—as 
described by the Court, “the strictest scrutiny of any purported local 
purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”121 In 
addition, even laws that do not facially discriminate may run afoul of the 
Commerce Clause if they burden or interfere with interstate commerce. In 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,122 the Court expressed this bar in terms of a 
balancing test: “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”123 
The statutes adopted by Delaware and several other states authorizing 
the use of corporate charter/bylaw forum-terms on their face create an 
asymmetry in favor of the state’s own courts and against the courts of 
other states; they permit a domestic corporation to designate an exclusive 
forum, but only if that forum is located in the state of incorporation. No 
other state’s court may be selected. Arguably, such statutes run afoul of 
the per se rule of invalidity as a form of facial discrimination against out-
of-state interests. 
                                                     
119. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1982) (holding that due process 
was violated when the state dismissed an administrative claim as untimely when the agency had failed 
to schedule a conference within the allowable time period). 
120. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). To overcome this presumption, 
a state would generally have to show that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose. 
E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding fish import ban because it protected 
native fisheries from risk of parasitic infection and adulteration that could not be served as well by 
available nondiscriminatory means) (citing City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627). 
121. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). 
122. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
123. Id. at 142. 
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To be sure, the rule of per se invalidity is subject to an important 
exception: a state may engage in self-promotion when the challenged law 
is aimed at favoring the state itself or its subdivisions, as distinct from 
private entities within the state.124 Delaware has an interest in maintaining 
its corporate-law brand—a composite of attractive law, efficient 
administration, and specialized courts with expertise and experience.125 
By bundling law and judicial decision-making together through the device 
of a law that privileges its own courts, as Section 115 does, Delaware 
engages in permissible discrimination if the law’s intent and effect are to 
aid the state by attracting corporate charters and generating franchise tax 
revenue.126 Other states, however, are not actively competing for 
incorporations and would not earn increased franchise taxes. These states 
have a substantially weaker self-interest in localizing disputes in their own 
courts.127 
The constitutional analysis changes considerably if discrimination 
were designed to promote the private interest of the local bar rather than 
the public interest of the state.128 From that perspective, forum-term 
statutes that discriminate in favor of the state’s own courts would be seen 
not as a state revenue-raising device, but rather as a rent-seeking 
                                                     
124. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342–43 (2008); United Haulers Ass’n v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342–44 (2007). 
125. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 276–77 (1985).  
126. A statute that comes within the self-promotion exception is subject to a balancing test that 
considers the burdens imposed on commerce “in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike, 397 
U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362. U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). To the 
extent Delaware law functions as “de facto ‘national’ U.S. corporate law,” see Armour et al., supra 
note 30, at 1398, other states arguably have an interest in participating in the elaboration of corporate 
law and of sharing in the economic benefits that accrue from charters and litigation. Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); see also C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). But see Paul N. Cox, The 
Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—a Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. 
CORP. L. 317, 318–19 (1988) (questioning whether the Court’s commerce clause analysis “is 
substantially narrower than the balancing test rhetoric that the Court often employs”). 
127. See generally Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg 
Ringe eds., 2015) (discussing extent to which states compete for incorporations). 
128. In proposing Section 115, the Delaware bar clearly understood that the statute could be cast 
as self-interested and protectionist. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of 
Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1673–74 (2016) (concluding that, although the interest 
of the bar played a role in passage of the legislation, viewing the legislation as a product of lawyers’ 
self-interest is incomplete); Maria Slobodchikova, Comment, Forum Selection Bylaws in Delaware, 
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 466, 474–76 (2015); Alison Frankel, Forum Selection Clauses Are 
Killing Multiforum M&A Litigation, REUTERS (June 24, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2014/06/24/forum-selection-clauses-are-killing-multiforum-ma-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZ4N-KRRZ]. 
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mechanism by an elite subset of the local bar, consistent with the interest-
group theory of corporate law.129 We need not resolve the issue whether 
any discriminatory statutes violate the Commerce Clause,130 for our point 
is more modest. Discrimination of the sort entailed by forum-term statutes 
at the least raises constitutional concerns that other courts may take into 
account in ruling on the enforceability of a forum-term. In this sense, this 
discrimination constrains the kinds of forum-terms that may be included 
in a charter or bylaw.131 
B.  Consent and the Validity or Enforceability of Corporate Forum-
Terms 
A second implication of our analysis affects the weight that ought to be 
given to party consent when a court assesses the validity and 
enforceability of a corporate forum-term. The contractual approach to 
forum-terms makes party consent the touchstone of validity. 
Enforceability is another matter. Disputes about forum-terms typically 
come into play when a lawsuit is filed in a court not designated in the 
corporate charter or bylaw. If the action is filed in state court, state law 
will govern whether the party seeking to enforce the forum-term should 
move to dismiss on the merits, for improper venue, or on grounds of forum 
                                                     
129. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987). As others have noted, Delaware has in effect 
assigned legislative agenda-setting for corporate law amendments to a private group—a committee 
of the corporate bar. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s 
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 70 (2009) (describing the practice of having the 
corporate bar responsible for adapting and revising the Delaware code, subject to ratification by the 
General Assembly). 
130. We have identified no successful Commerce Clause challenge to a state restriction on 
jurisdiction of the sort implicated in forum-terms. The most analogous rulings are to tolling statutes 
that have been invalidated, insofar as they bar non-state corporations from the protections of statutes 
of limitations unless they submit to personal jurisdiction within the state. E.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. 
v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 892 (1988) (“To gain the protection of the limitations period, 
Midwesco would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject itself 
to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.”); cf. Cox, supra note 126, at 344–45 (discussing the 
market participant exception to discriminatory state laws, and asking but not answering whether the 
Dormant Commerce Clause bars a state from “authorizing private conduct for the purpose of 
encouraging retention of corporate assets within the state,” and recognizing that corporations, because 
their “existence and attributes are state determined,” may be “characterized legitimately as 
instruments of state policy”). 
131. See Jeff C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Keeping Current: Delaware Passes Legislation 
Prohibiting Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Validating Exclusive Forum Selection Bylaws for Stock 
Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY (A.B.A. Bus. L. Sec., Chicago, Ill.), Aug. 2015, https://www.american 
bar.org/publications/blt/2015/08/keeping_current.html [https://perma.cc/98K3-3D2M] (questioning 
whether exclusive forum-term giving differential treatment to Delaware and foreign courts as 
exclusive “will draw a constitutional attack”). 
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non conveniens.132 If the action is filed in federal court, the party seeking 
to enforce the forum-term would move to transfer to another federal 
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or to dismiss on grounds of forum 
non conveniens if the forum-term lists a state court or a non-federal court, 
such as the court of a foreign country.133 When the parties to a contract 
have specified a forum for disputes arising from their contract, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that courts should enforce the clause “[i]n all but 
the most unusual cases,”134 directing that the district court is to accord no 
weight to the plaintiff’s private interests and to consider only public 
factors bearing on the decision to transfer or dismiss.135 The Court’s 
approach does not bind state courts,136 but it is influential.137 
In our view, private factors ought not automatically drop out of the 
enforceability calculus for charter or bylaw forum-terms. Rather, given 
the attenuated nature of party consent to some corporate forum-terms, 
private factors deserve consideration, at least in some litigation contexts; 
likewise, consent ought not automatically ensure a term’s validity or 
enforcement if public factors tilt in favor of an alternative forum.138 
1.  The Absence of Any Consent 
Forum-terms should not be enforced in circumstances when the 
plaintiffs have given no consent at all—not even meaningful consent to 
the process for amending charters and bylaws—to the provision. Such 
consent is generally lacking for any claim that is not either a derivative 
                                                     
132. See generally J. Zak Ritchie, Note, A Tie That Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability 
in West Virginia, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 95 (2010). 
133. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 568, 576 (2013). The 
Supreme Court left open whether a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6) would also be 
appropriate. Id. at 580 n.4. 
134. Id. at 583. 
135. Id. at 581–82. 
136. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“federal law governs the 
enforceability of the forum-selection clause” in a cruise-passenger ticket in an admiralty suit); Stewart 
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28–32 (1988) (law of lex fori applied in diversity action). 
137. See Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law of Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
643, 672–73 (2015). 
138. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a variant of the problem in the context of an 
ordinary contractual forum-term resisted by persons who were not parties to the contract. Given the 
complete absence of consent, the appeals court found error in the district court’s failure to consider 
private factors, explaining, “where the Atlantic Marine framework would wholly deprive non-
contracting parties of their right to seek transfer on the basis of their private interests, the customary 
§ 1404(a) analysis guarantees them that right.” In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 390, 403 
(3d Cir. 2017).  
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claim asserted on behalf of the corporation or a claim asserted by a 
shareholder. 
As we have discussed, some forum-terms encompass claims “based 
upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or 
stockholder in such capacity.”139 This broad phrasing would include 
claims by security holders other than shareholders under the federal 
securities laws or even more mundane claims, such as a claim for 
employment discrimination. In addition, many jurisdictions, including 
Delaware, treat veil-piercing claims by creditors as claims governed by 
the internal affairs doctrine.140 Because forum-terms generally include 
“any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine,” 
such claims would also be swept into the scope of forum terms. Either of 
these claims, for example, also would fall within the scope of Section 115 
of Delaware law.141 
But as to claims that are neither claims by stockholders nor derivative 
claims,142 the plaintiffs cannot fairly be said to have consented either to 
the substance of a forum-term or to the process by which such a term may 
be inserted into a charter or bylaw. Some of the plaintiffs who may have 
such claims (such as tort creditors seeking veil piercing) may not have 
voluntarily engaged in any transaction with the company. Others, such as 
non-shareholder security holders, employees, or contract creditors, may 
have taken a voluntary action with regard to the company, such as entering 
into a contract or buying securities. But, unlike a shareholder, they neither 
have any power over the content of a charter or a bylaw nor any reason to 
believe that the terms of a charter or bylaw could reduce their contractual 
rights or any rights arising under non-corporate laws.143 
                                                     
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2017). 
140. See Gregory Scott Crispi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should 
Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008). 
141. The former would be claims based on a violation of a duty by a director or officer in such 
capacity; the latter would be claims as to which the Chancery Court has jurisdiction as well as, 
arguably, claims based upon a violation of a duty by a stockholder in such capacity. See L.B. Labs, 
Inc. v. Lance Indus., Inc., No. CIV. A 5253, 1981 WL 318274, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1981) 
(Chancery Court has exclusive jurisdiction over veil piercing claims). 
142. Creditors of insolvent corporations have standing to pursue derivative claims, such as claims 
for self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries that normally are pursued by shareholders. N. Am. Catholic 
Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). Creditors in these cases are 
residual claimants that stand in the position normally occupied by shareholders (who lack incentives 
to pursue these claims if the company is insolvent).  
143. The Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise upheld the validity of forum-selection term in a 
consumer contract that was merely a form provision and not subject to negotiation. See Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991). However, the Court emphasized in its decision 
that the party against whom the term applied conceded having had notice of the term. The Court left 
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2.  Corporate Forum-Terms and the Problem of Ineffective Relief 
Forum-terms become problematic when the selected forum is not an 
efficient or effective forum to adjudicate the entire dispute. This problem 
can arise when the selected forum lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 
some of the claims or personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants. 
These defects could weigh against the enforcement of a forum-term 
even if the suit involves, for example, an intra-corporate dispute of a 
Delaware corporation and the forum-term selects Delaware as a forum, 
and even if consent is manifest. Almost half of the forum-terms adopted 
by Delaware corporations after 2012 specify Delaware’s Chancery Court 
as the exclusive forum.144 As a state court, the Chancery Court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over claims under the Securities Exchange 
Act.145 However claims that a company violated Section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act by making misleading disclosures to 
shareholders in a proxy statement146 often are intertwined with claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty. This is so for two reasons. First, a misleading 
                                                     
open how an absence of notice would affect the validity of a forum-term and further emphasized that 
forum-terms contained in form contracts are subject to review for reasonableness. Id. at 595. Whether 
the ability to learn about the existence of a forum-term before making an investment decision ought 
to constitute the requisite consent for validity is unclear.  
We acknowledge that small shareholders do not always find it worthwhile to examine all charter 
and bylaws provisions in detail before they make their investment decisions. Cf. G. Marcus Cole, 
Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers Should Agree to Form Contracts Without 
Even Reading Them, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 413, 438–39, 455 (2015) (stressing importance of 
reading non-price terms when markets are not competitive). However, institutional aspects of publicly 
traded corporations may ameliorate concerns about a lack of notice that otherwise are present in the 
consumer contracts setting. According to the efficient-market hypothesis, the stock price of securities 
traded in thick, public markets reflects all publicly available information. See Mark H. Van De 
Voorde, The Fraud on the Market Theory and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a 
Consistent Standard, 14 J. CORP. L. 443, 464 & n.168 (1989) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 243–244 & n.22 (1988)). While the extent to which stock prices are “efficient” is disputed, 
information on charter and bylaw provisions is relatively easy to obtain and evaluation of these terms 
is aided by the fact that they tend to be standardized and common. See Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 761 (1995). Unlike 
consumers who, when faced with a multi-page agreement in legalese, rationally decide not to read it, 
larger institutional investors in stocks may find it worthwhile to check for and evaluate provisions in 
charters and bylaws that are arguably material; even smaller investors, who do not find it worthwhile, 
may be protected by the information obtained, and the corresponding investment and pricing 
decisions, of the larger investors. On the other hand, it is recognized that procedural terms are difficult 
to price and often are undervalued. See Cox, supra note 67, at 262. 
144. Allen, supra note 45, at 4 (“Of the 112 post-Boilermakers bylaws, only 43 percent provide 
that the Delaware Court of Chancery is the exclusive forum . . . .”). 
145. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012); Securities Act of 1933, 
§ 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012).  
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.  
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disclosure is itself a violation of state corporate law.147 Second, because a 
fully informed shareholder vote cleanses many actions that would 
otherwise amount to a breach of fiduciary duty (for example, an unfair 
self-dealing transaction), many suits involve an alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty as well as alleged deficiencies in disclosures made to 
shareholders.148 A federal court has power and could exercise discretion 
to dispose both the federal claim and the state claim; the latter would be 
within the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.149 The Delaware 
court, by contrast, could dispose only the state claims. 
A state court also might lack personal jurisdiction over some key 
defendants. The company is subject to general jurisdiction in the forum 
state if that is the state in which the company is incorporated or has its 
principal place of business; as such, it is amenable to suit on any claim.150 
Moreover, in our view, if the company has adopted a forum-term in its 
charter or bylaw in a state other than the state of incorporation, then 
specific jurisdiction over the company would be appropriate as to any 
claim within that clause. Furthermore, under Delaware law,151 any director 
or officer of a Delaware corporation by accepting that position is deemed 
to have consented to jurisdiction in the courts of that state for any claim 
concerning breach of fiduciary duty.152 
                                                     
147. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (citing Stroud v. 
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992)) (fiduciary duties require that directors disclose to shareholders 
all material information bearing upon a vote). 
148. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015) (business 
judgment rule is the appropriate standard of review in post-closing damages suits involving mergers 
that are not subject to the entire fairness standard and that have been approved by a fully informed, 
uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 
644 (Del. 2014) (business judgment rule applies in self-dealing transactions with controlling 
shareholder if transaction is approved by properly functioning independent committee and by fully 
informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders).  
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). 
150. Daimler AG v. Bauman, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tire 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)) (a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction 
in its state of incorporation and its principal place of business).  
151. Delaware is alone in having a director deemed-consent statute. Winship, infra note 152, at 
1183 (stating that “no other states’ director consent statutes have survived”). But some states include 
breach of a director’s duties among the acts covered by a long-arm statute. Id. at tbl.2 (listing sixteen 
states, including Delaware). Despite the claim that the charter or bylaws constitute a contract 
“between the stockholders, the directors and officers, and the corporation” (see Boilermakers Loc. 
154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013)), we are doubtful that a bylaw 
forum-term on its own would confer personal jurisdiction in the designated forum over the directors, 
officers, or controlling shareholders of the respective company. 
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2017). The statute has covered corporate officers since 2003. 
Act of June 30, 2003, 74 Del. Laws, ch. 83 (2004) (codified as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b)). 
The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 180 (Del. 
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However, a lawsuit involving a corporation’s internal affairs may 
involve additional defendants. Controlling shareholders and investment 
banks often are crucial parties to a suit involving breach of fiduciary 
duty.153 Controlling shareholders independently owe fiduciary duties 
under Delaware law;154 investment banks are sometimes sued as aiders 
and abettors of breaches by directors.155 Indeed, controlling shareholders 
are generally alleged to be the principal beneficiary of a director’s breach, 
and usually have the greatest ability to pay damages; and investment 
banks as “aiders and abettors” may be the only party that is liable under 
Delaware law for certain kinds of breach.156 If these defendants did not 
engage in in-state conduct,157 they could be found to lack the requisite 
contacts to support the Delaware court’s exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction over them.158 
                                                     
1980). However, subsequent developments in the law of personal jurisdiction have led to a rethinking 
about the constitutionality of the implied-consent statute as applied to directors. See Eric A. 
Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783, 
785 (2013) (arguing that Delaware relies upon an “unconstitutional amenability statute . . . to secure 
in personam jurisdiction over nonresident directors and officers of Delaware corporations”). 
Questions also have been raised about the constitutionality of the provision with respect to officers. 
See Verity Winship, Jurisdiction over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1188–95. 
153. At least one court has construed a standard exclusive forum bylaw as not covering claims 
against controlling shareholders. See Anderson v. GTCR, LLC, No. 16-10-LPS, 2016 WL 5723657, 
at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 1-16-CV-03870 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2016). 
154. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994). 
155. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 875 (Del. 2015) (upholding liability of 
financial adviser). 
156. In most states, companies can adopt charter provisions exculpating directors from personal 
liability for certain breaches of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Under 
Delaware law, an outside party who aided and abetted these breaches would remain personally liable 
even if the directors who committed these breaches avoid liability as a result of such an exculpatory 
clause. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
RBC Capital Mkts., 129 A.3d at 875.  
157. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Calif., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(“In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation 
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that 
takes place in the forum State.’” (alteration in original) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 54 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))). 
158. Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1229 (Del. Ch. 2001) (finding 
jurisdiction over majority shareholder based on acts taken in Delaware in furtherance of a conspiracy), 
rev’d on other grounds, 817 A.2d 249 (Del. 2002); Red Sail Easter Ltd. Partners, L.P. v. Radio City 
Music Hall Prods., Inc., No. CIV. A. 12036, 1992 WL 171420, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1992) 
(ownership of Delaware corporation is itself not sufficient to subject parent corporation to Delaware 
jurisdiction except in double derivative suit where parent is indispensable party and would not be 
exposed to pay any judgment). Whether a court has personal jurisdiction is determined as of the date 
of the suit’s filing. Shatas v. Snyder, No. 73716-3-I, 2016 WL 6084113, at *5–6 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 
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When the selected forum court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 
all claims or personal jurisdiction over an indispensable party,159 an 
exclusive forum provision would presumably be invalid under Section 
115 of Delaware law and such terms ought not to be valid or enforceable 
if authorized by the laws of other states. Alternatively, a court should hold 
in such a case that fiduciary duties require the corporation to waive the 
provision. 
Different considerations come into play when the selected forum court 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over some but not all claims or lacks 
personal jurisdiction over some defendants (none of whom are 
indispensable in the doctrinal sense).160 Enforcement of the forum-term 
would mean that, to provide full relief, the lawsuit would have to be 
divided among the courts of different states or between the federal and 
state systems. Such a bifurcation in related lawsuits would result in 
additional costs to the plaintiffs, the corporation, potential witnesses, and 
the court system. Although principles of res judicata typically will lower 
the costs of litigation by avoiding the problem of duplicative fact finding, 
the federal system may have an interest in avoiding state fact finding that 
will affect questions of federal law. 
In this situation, consent ought to be only one of several factors 
considered by the court when the validity or enforceability of the term is 
at issue. If a lawsuit asserting all related claims is brought in a non-
                                                     
17, 2016) (reversing trial court’s dismissal as subsequent consent to jurisdiction was insufficient to 
establish jurisdiction as of the date of filing). 
159. Whether a party is indispensable under Delaware law is governed by Del. Ch. Ct. R. 19(a), 
which compels joinder: 
[W]here complete relief cannot be accorded among the parties in the person’s absence, or where 
the person claims an interest and cannot protect that interest in their absence or that interest 
leaves any party subject to a substantial risk of inconsistent obligations. A necessary party should 
have not only an interest in some part of the controversy but the interest must be such that a final 
decree cannot be made which will neither touch upon that party’s interest nor leave the 
controversy in such a state that the final determination would be inconsistent with equity and 
good conscience. 
Tuscan Constr. Inc. v. Capaldi, No. CV 10861-MZ, 2016 WL 3212491, at *2 & n.9 (Del. Ch. May 
24, 2016) (citing Joseph v. Shell Oil. Co., 498 A.2d 1117, 1125 (Del. Ch. 1985)). In some cases, the 
lack of jurisdiction over an indispensable party has been treated as grounds for dismissing the entire 
lawsuit as against all parties. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Lorenzo, No. CV 10692, 1990 WL 156529, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1990) (class action by Lorenzo alleging corporate mismanagement at Eastern 
Air Lines dismissed for failure to join Eastern Air Lines). 
160. For example, a controlling shareholder or an outside aider and abettor to a breach of duty 
would generally not be an indispensable party in a lawsuit against board members. See, e.g., Terrydale 
Liquidating Tr. v. Gramlich, 549 F. Supp. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (no statutory basis for personal 
jurisdiction under New York law against aider and abettor of federal securities law violations where 
cause of action did not arise out of transaction in New York), aff’d sub nom. Terrydale Liquidating 
Tr. v. Barness, 846 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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selected forum that has jurisdiction over all of the claims and parties, the 
non-selected forum court should independently consider private and 
public factors that bear upon party convenience and the interests of justice, 
taking account of the public interest in reducing judicial costs and 
ensuring effective redress. Such an analysis should include not only the 
extent of the shareholders’ consent to the forum-term, but also the 
significance of the claims that could not be adjudicated in the selected 
forum, as well as the expertise of the selected forum in resolving those 
claims that it does have power to hear. 
3.  Terms that Burden Plaintiff or Promote Self-Interested Forum 
Shopping 
Corporate forum-terms also carry the potential for abuse both to private 
interests and to public interests in such matters as law enforcement and 
efficient dispute resolution. In particular, the adoption of a forum-term 
may be motivated by a desire to steer litigation to a forum that is highly 
inconvenient for the anticipated plaintiffs or that has procedural rules that 
are unusual or prejudicial to obtaining relief for meritorious claims. We 
consider the case when the company is not publicly-traded and the 
selected forum is not the state of incorporation.161 
In the context of a non-public corporation, the plaintiff in a lawsuit 
against the company often will be a minority shareholder. Although the 
stakes of the lawsuit may be significant relative to the resources of the 
parties, they typically will be much smaller than the stakes in suits 
involving publicly traded corporations. Having to litigate in a remote 
forum could impose a significant burden on plaintiffs. The private factor 
of convenience thus carries different weight, and a weight that cannot 
fairly be dismissed by resorting to fictional consent given by such 
plaintiff-shareholders. The public factors also will be significant. For 
example, resolution of the dispute is likely to depend on witness 
testimony, and not simply documentary evidence. An inconveniently 
located forum thus may pose additional burdens in terms of having to 
obtain discovery from non-parties outside the jurisdiction of the forum or 
to secure testimony from these non-parties at trial. These costs need to be 
considered when assessing whether a forum-term should be enforced. 
                                                     
161. This situation could arise even in Delaware. Although Section 115 of the Delaware Code does 
not permit a Delaware company to include a forum-term that excludes Delaware as a forum, it permits 
a clause that selects both Delaware courts and the courts of another state as exclusive fora. To the 
extent that the Delaware courts lack personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, such a clause would 
effectively force plaintiffs to bring a case in the courts of a state other than the state of incorporation. 
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Another consideration is the ability of a forum-term to steer litigation 
into a forum with procedures that may cause prejudice to plaintiffs. This 
concern is heightened if the directors have adopted a forum-term for 
causes of action that arose before adoption of the term or in anticipation 
of a transaction likely to generate a dispute. Under basic conflicts rules, a 
court is permitted to apply its own procedures to the resolution of a dispute 
that involves foreign law.162 A firm’s selection of a forum other than the 
state of incorporation might be a strategic maneuver to benefit from the 
substantive law of the state of incorporation, coupled with the procedural 
law of the state of the selected forum. To the extent that a forum-term 
channels an internal corporate dispute into a forum other than the state of 
incorporation, concerns about procedural fairness are potentially present, 
particularly if the procedures undermine the plaintiff’s interest in an 
effective remedy. Red flags ought to be raised if the selected forum has, 
relative to the state of incorporation, a statute of limitations for corporate 
disputes that may bar an asserted claim,163 a requirement for higher bonds 
as a precondition for suits (or interim relief or appeals),164 more restrictive 
notice rules for derivative lawsuits or class actions,165 or a “loser-pays” 
rule that may be unfavorable to plaintiffs.166 If a forum-term designates a 
forum that has procedural provisions that are materially adverse to the 
plaintiff, as compared to the procedural rules of the state of incorporation, 
then a forum that was adopted midstream should not be enforced unless 
                                                     
162. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“All matters 
of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.”); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 
717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is 
competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated 
in its courts.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[T]he constitutional provision for a 
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a 
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.”). 
163. Compare In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 584 (2007) (citing 10 DEL. CODE ANN. 
§ 8615 (2017)) (three-year period for breach of fiduciary duty claims), with Maxson v. Travis Cty. 
Rent Account, 21 S.W.3d 311, 319 (Tex. App. 1999) (two-year period). 
164. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663, 686 (1974) (noting differences in state law requirements for positing of security for expenses). 
165. Compare In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 555 (Minn. 2008) (under Minnesota 
law, court is required to apply business judgment rule and defer to decision by a Special Litigation 
Committee to approve settlement of derivative action as long as members were sufficiently 
independent and pursued investigation in good faith), with Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 
789 (Del. 1981) (even if Special Litigation Committee was independent and acted in good faith, court 
may use its own business judgment to determine whether motion by committee should be granted).  
166. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: 
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (1998) (noting 
that “a ‘loser pays’ rule impacts disproportionately on plaintiffs’ access to the courts”).  
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the plaintiff (or her predecessor in interest) actually voted in favor of that 
term.167 
Similar concerns can arise in two additional circumstances. First, for 
claims that are not governed by the substantive law of the state of 
incorporation, even a term that designates the courts of the state of 
incorporation as exclusive fora may be problematic. This could be the case 
when the procedural law of the selected forum state is, relative to the state 
supplying the substantive law, adverse to plaintiffs. Second, forum-terms 
deserve scrutiny where states differ in their conflict of laws rules and the 
rules of the selected forum state point to a substantive law that is 
materially more adverse to a plaintiff than the substantive law designated 
by the rules of the state where the plaintiff brought a lawsuit. In all these 
cases, courts should presumptively give no weight to a forum-term in a 
charter or bylaw that was adopted midstream unless the plaintiff (or her 
predecessor in interest) actually voted in favor of that term. 
4.  Forum-Terms and Limiting Parallel Suits 
We next consider how party consent to a forum-term ought to affect 
the analysis when courts are faced with the problem of parallel derivative 
and class action lawsuits. Corporate forum-terms do not explicitly deal 
with such suits. But by channeling suits into a single forum (or two fora 
if the clause permits suit in both federal and state court), they greatly 
reduce the potential for parallel litigation.168 
We note at the outset that applying forum-terms to derivative and class 
action shareholder lawsuits raises somewhat different concerns than 
applying forum-terms to non-representative suits. While shareholders 
may not actually have consented to the inclusion of the forum-term in the 
corporate charter or bylaw, they also will not actually have consented to 
the initiation of lawsuits on their behalf in a particular forum. In other 
words, forum-terms in representative litigation generally entail two 
                                                     
167. The inquiry would be analogous to that of an enforcing court when determining whether 
offensive collateral estoppel may be asserted against a non-party to the judgment. In this situation, 
the Supreme Court has looked to whether the party to be bound had a “full and fair” opportunity to 
litigate in the prior action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).  
168. See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who 
Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 41–46 (2012) (defending forum 
clauses that specify the state of incorporation as the efficient solution to the problem of multi-
jurisdictional litigation). Whether multijurisdictional litigation is a problem, or a problem of broad 
scope, is questioned. See Brian J.M. Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate Law 
Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 874 (2013) (“[T]here is not much evidence to 
support the contention that parties are presently seeking to bring merger disputes or shareholder 
disputes to forums other than Delaware.”).  
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agency relationships—the named plaintiff and her lawyer as “agent” of 
the shareholder class and the board that adopted the forum-term as agent 
of the shareholders—where the agents may pursue their own interest at 
the expense of the interests of shareholders. The possibility that institution 
of the lawsuit in a non-selected forum may not be in the best interest of 
shareholders even from an ex post perspective is thus uniquely present in 
representative litigation. 
In our view, the balance of factors may tip in favor of enforcing the 
selected forum when representative suits are at issue. Courts and 
commentators have argued that a significant subset of shareholder 
derivative and class action lawsuits—in particular, shareholder suits filed 
after a merger has been announced—lack merit.169 These lawsuits usually 
allege that the board breached its fiduciary duty in approving the 
merger.170 The argument that many of these suits lack merit is based on 
the observation that a high percentage of mergers attract lawsuits, often 
filed right after the transaction is announced;171 that many of these suits 
are settled with minimal investigation of the merits;172 and that settlements 
often entail no monetary recovery for the shareholder plaintiffs, but 
                                                     
169. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr., 834 F.2d 677, 681–82 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Posner, J.) (“Ordinarily the named plaintiffs are nominees, indeed pawns, of the lawyer, and 
ordinarily the unnamed class members have individually too little stake to spend time monitoring the 
lawyer—and their only coordination is through him. . . . The danger of collusive settlements . . . 
makes it imperative that the district judge conduct a careful inquiry into the fairness of a settlement 
to the class members before allowing it to go into effect and extinguish, by the operation of res 
judicata, the claims of class members who do not opt out of the settlement.” (citations omitted)); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for 
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 686–91 
(1986) (arguing that class counsel has incentive to settle early and quickly under both the percentage 
of recovery and lodestar methods for determining attorneys’ fees); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful 
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 
(1985); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class 
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 232; Rhonda Wasserman, 
Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000) (“[C]lass counsel generally face immense 
pressure to settle and even to collude with the defendant to settle the class claims cheaply in exchange 
for a generous fee.”). 
170. Depending on the type of transaction, the breach may be reflected in agreeing to an unfair 
transaction with a controlling shareholder or insider who is acquiring the company in the merger; 
including deal protection measures in the merger agreement (such as termination fees or no-shop 
provisions) that make it harder for a competing bidder to emerge; not following a proper process to 
assure that the company is sold for the highest price; or making false or misleading disclosures to 
shareholders in soliciting their votes on approving the merger. 
171. See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1827–29 (2004).  
172. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 487–92 (2015).  
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significant attorney’s fees. Critics refer to these fees as a transaction tax 
that is imposed on the shareholders.173 
Parallel litigation forces a defendant to bear the duplicative cost of 
defending suits in several courts. These costs are ultimately borne by 
shareholders, either because they continue to hold equity in the 
corporation or because an acquirer, anticipating these costs, will offer a 
lower amount to acquire their shares. This being said, the literature on the 
topic may exaggerate these costs: lawsuits filed after a merger 
announcement and settled quickly do not generate high litigation costs 
because they do not generate substantial litigation activity such as 
discovery or trial. 
Application of the forum-term may be beneficial to the defendant-
corporation and shareholders for reasons that go beyond litigation costs. 
In many merger-related lawsuits, the most important procedural move 
happens early in the lawsuit when plaintiffs move for a preliminary 
injunction to stop the transaction from going forward during the pendency 
of the lawsuit. If granted, the injunction leaves the target company in 
limbo until the acquisition is consummated. During this period of limbo, 
management generally is oriented towards preserving the status quo, 
rather than maximizing company value. Moreover, delay increases the 
risk that the transaction will never be consummated. Many merger 
agreements permit the parties to a merger to walk away from the deal if 
the merger is not consummated by a certain date.174 In addition, most 
merger agreements include so-called “materially adverse change” clauses 
which permit an acquirer to terminate the merger agreement if there are 
significant changes in the business of the target that reduce its value.175 
The longer the period between the signing of the agreement and its 
consummation, the more likely it is that such changes have occurred. 
Because publicly-traded companies involved in merger transactions often 
have a value in the tens of billions of dollars, even a decline in value 
resulting from status quo oriented management or the risk of non-
                                                     
173. See, e.g., Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing 
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 108 (2014) (observing that in 2012, 
90% of public company mergers and acquisitions valued at over $100 million were subject to 
litigation by objecting shareholders, and concluding that “‘plaintiffs’ attorneys have successfully 
attached what amounts to a transaction tax to an overwhelming majority of large public company 
deals”); Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for 
Investors, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-
02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals 
[https://perma.cc/HCV7-JGHQ]. 
174. See, e.g., HELIOS & MATHESON ANALYTICS INC., AGREEMENT AND PLAN OF MERGER BY AND 
AMONG HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTICS INC., ZONE ACQUISITION, INC., AND ZONE 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., DATED AS OF JULY 7, 2016 (FORM 8-K, EX. 2.1) (2017), § 6.1(b)(i), at 54. 
175. Id. §§ 2.3, 3.3, at 8–9, 22. 
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consummation that is small in percentage terms can be high in absolute 
dollar terms. 
A preliminary injunction of a merger thus has the effect of imposing 
potentially significant costs on the defendants. At the same time, the 
preliminary injunction may be significantly and legitimately beneficial to 
plaintiffs. In particular, the preliminary injunction may enable the 
correction of materially deficient disclosures to the shareholders. Our 
point is not that preliminary injunctions are never or rarely justified in the 
merger context. Rather, our point is that preliminary injunctions impose 
burdens on defendants even in circumstances when they are not justified 
and generate no benefits to plaintiffs. The threat of obtaining a preliminary 
injunction is thus fertile ground for strike suits—a situation in which the 
costs to defendants so exceed the benefits to plaintiffs that the motion for 
interim relief holds settlement value to the plaintiffs even though the 
recovery for a litigated case was low or non-existing. 
Two additional features contribute to the strike-suit potential of 
injunctions. It is well recognized that preliminary injunctions carry a 
greater risk than other remedies that a court might enter. For this reason, 
interlocutory review is permitted on appeal in the federal system despite 
the strong rule of finality that otherwise governs the appealability of 
judgments; an interlocutory judgment may be reconsidered and modified 
prior to final judgment.176 Although the granting of a preliminary 
injunction is accompanied by an evidentiary hearing, the court’s review 
of the evidence by definition is limited and provisional and so entails a 
greater risk of error than fully litigated cases. Hence, injunctions may be 
granted when, with a full record, they would have been denied. Moreover, 
a principal cost imposed by a preliminary injunction is delay if a merger 
is not permitted to go forward on the expected timetable; thus, the cost of 
an improperly granted preliminary injunction would persist even if the 
relief ultimately is modified after a full hearing or is overturned on appeal. 
The potential for legal error in the grant of interim relief, coupled with the 
costs that even a properly granted interim relief may impose, tends to 
induce strike-suits aimed at obtaining such interim relief and then settling 
the litigation prior to a final disposition. 
Second, strategies that may ordinarily deter strike suits (such as a 
defendant’s calling plaintiff’s bluff by refusing to settle and compelling 
plaintiff to bear the costs of litigating a low-recovery case or developing 
a reputation for not settling) may not work well in a preliminary injunction 
context. Once the motion for a preliminary injunction is granted, the costs 
of any delay produced by not settling may be so highly asymmetric that 
                                                     
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).  
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defendants are under severe pressure to settle. And both because of the 
high asymmetry in costs and because defendants in these cases are not 
repeat players, developing a reputation for not settling these cases is 
difficult. And if plaintiffs believe that they can settle the case once an 
injunction is granted, they can credibly threaten to bear the limited 
expense of obtaining an injunction in the first place. 
Parallel litigation enhances the potential for strike suits grounded in the 
threat of preliminary injunctions. Although one court may decline to issue 
interim relief, another set of lawyers with a different client may seek 
preliminary relief in a second court. Of course, the granting of a 
preliminary injunction is a matter of equity, and as a matter of comity the 
second court may not be receptive to ordering interim relief where forum 
shopping is manifest. But judges differ in the degree of comity they feel 
towards their sister courts. Moreover, there may be good policy reasons 
for a second court to treat an earlier denial of a preliminary injunction by 
a different court as not preclusive. For example, the case may have been 
filed first in the second court; the plaintiffs in that court hold more 
meaningful stakes and hence are better representatives; or the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have engaged in more investigation. An enforceable corporate 
forum-term in this context reduces the risk of strike suits based on the 
threat of obtaining interim relief by limiting such suits to a single forum. 
The second potential benefit of a corporate forum-term flows from 
particularities of Delaware law and clauses that select Delaware as the 
forum. A key danger to lawyer-driven suits is the risk of a court-
sanctioned resolution that provides the defendant with a broadly-worded 
release encompassing claims that could have substantial merit but have 
not yet been sufficiently investigated. From the defendant’s perspective, 
the value of such a settlement may far off-set any perceived transaction 
tax—indeed, the settlement is sometimes characterized as an insurance 
policy against future claims where the attorney’s fees paid to plaintiff’s 
lawyer are the insurance premium.177 To the shareholder, such settlements 
are a triple whammy: like other forms of insurance, they undermine 
incentives to comply with the law; unlike other forms of insurance, the 
potential shareholder-victims do not receive any insurance payout; and the 
attorney’s fees/insurance premium is priced into the deal term and thus 
comes at the expense of shareholders. 
Corporate forum-terms that locate litigation in Delaware indirectly deal 
with the problem of settlements of this sort. The reason stems from the 
                                                     
177. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–58 (2013). 
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approach of the Delaware Chancery Court to settlements, set out in 
Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in In re Trulia.178 In re Trulia concerned 
a proposed settlement of a shareholder class action challenging a merger. 
Shortly after the transaction was announced, several groups of 
shareholders brought separate lawsuits; after limited discovery, the suits 
settled within four months of filing. The settlement was “disclosure-only:” 
Trulia agreed to provide shareholders with supplementary disclosure 
about the merger, but shareholders received no other recovery. In return, 
plaintiffs dropped their motion for a preliminary injunction and agreed to 
provide a broad release including any claims “relating in any conceivable 
way” to the merger. In addition, defendants agreed not to oppose payment 
of attorney’s fees of $375,000.179 
Although no shareholder objected to the proposed settlement,180 the 
Chancery Court rejected it—finding that the additional disclosures were 
neither material nor “even helpful” to Trulia’s shareholders.181 The court 
noted the problems with merger-related suits that we discussed above: 
almost every merger involving a public corporation engenders a “flurry of 
class action lawsuits,” many of which lack merit;182 these suits 
nevertheless result in fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers who settle quickly on 
terms that offer no monetary benefit to the stockholders they represent, 
usually involving supplemental disclosures of questionable value;183 
defendants readily agree to provide such disclosures and advocate the 
                                                     
178. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
179. Id. at 889. 
180. At a hearing on the fairness of the settlement, the court asked the parties for supplemental 
briefing on the benefits of disclosure and the rationale for the scope of the release. In response, an 
amicus curiae brief was filed by Professor Sean Griffith and the scope of the release was narrowed. 
See Brief of Sean J. Griffith as Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2015) (No. 10020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945. 
181. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 908–09. 
182. Id. at 891, 894 (citing MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, TAKEOVER 
LITIGATION IN 2015, at 2 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/6XW9-5RK3]) 
(in 2014, 94.4% and in 2015, 87.7% of transactions involving more than $100 million triggered 
litigation and in 2012, 76.0% of such litigation in Delaware was settled for solely supplemental 
disclosures); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (contending that litigation 
challenging mergers is ubiquitous, results in no meaningful recovery, but mostly benefits lawyers 
who earn fees); Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring 
Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 491, 534 (2016) (arguing that a settlement that provides only immaterial supplemental 
disclosures is a good proxy for a weak claim).  
183. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 172, at 478 (showing that 316 of 411 non-dismissed cases 
involved a settlement for disclosures only and that meant fee award in these cases was $749,000, 
whereas only 28 cases involved increased consideration). 
11 - Hershkoff & Kahan.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  6:44 PM 
2018] FORUM-SELECTION PROVISIONS 307 
 
approval of the settlement which also includes broad releases and 
attorney’s fees.184 
To deal with these problems, the court alerted practitioners to expect in 
future cases: 
that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued 
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address 
a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject 
matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to 
encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary 
duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that 
such claims have been investigated sufficiently. In using the term 
“plainly material,” I mean that it should not be a close call that 
the supplemental information is material as that term is defined 
under Delaware law. Where the supplemental information is not 
plainly material, it may be appropriate for the Court to appoint an 
amicus curiae to assist the Court in its evaluation of the alleged 
benefits of the supplemental disclosures, given the challenges 
posed by the non-adversarial nature of the typical disclosure 
settlement hearing. 
Finally, some have expressed concern that enhanced judicial 
scrutiny of disclosure settlements could lead plaintiffs to sue 
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions in the 
hope of finding a forum more hospitable to signing off on 
settlements of no genuine value. It is within the power of a 
Delaware corporation to enact a forum selection bylaw to address 
this concern.185 
In re Trulia represents the culmination of several earlier Delaware 
decisions expressing increasing concern about settlement of merger 
litigation. During 2015, three other members of the five-judge Chancery 
Court had criticized these settlements and subjected to increasing scrutiny 
of the “give” (the value of the disclosures) and the “get” (broad releases 
including potential claims without investigation) in assessing their 
                                                     
184. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 895 (citing Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes the 
Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements (U. Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. and Econ. Res. Paper No. 15-
40, Draft Dec. 17, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2689877 [https://perma.cc/3L63-A7ET]) (noting 
that in the recent Rural Metro litigation, the court “initially considered it a ‘very close call’” to reject 
a disclosure settlement that would have released claims that, after a new counsel took over, yielded a 
damage award of more than $100 million (Transcript at 134, In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 
102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 6350-VCL)). 
185. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898–99. 
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fairness.186 While seeking to control merger litigation resulting in broad 
releases, disclosure-only remedies, and attorney’s fees, the Chancery 
Court nevertheless remains an attractive forum for suits that generate large 
monetary recoveries for shareholders—and correspondingly high fees for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.187 
As Chancellor Bouchard noted, charter and bylaw forum-terms play an 
important function in the enforcement of this judicial “policy” against 
strike suits and overbroad releases.188 To the extent that courts in other 
states continue to approve disclosure-only settlements, award attorney’s 
fees, and approve broad releases, Delaware’s approach will be 
undermined. There are thus strong reasons for localizing deal-litigation in 
Delaware courts to enable the state to regulate merger activity of Delaware 
companies; to avoid the imposition of a transaction tax on shareholders; 
and to withhold “deal insurance” that insulate Delaware companies from 
liability for wrongdoing that the court would redress. In this situation, 
enforcement of a corporate forum-term by a non-selected forum in favor 
of Delaware serves the private interests of the shareholders. 
Enforcement of the forum-term thus would serve at least three 
important public interests. First, by centralizing the litigation in Delaware, 
use of the forum-term arguably encourages sound corporate governance. 
Second, it encourages the effective use of judicial resources by obviating 
or reducing the likelihood of competing lawsuits and the costs that 
accompany strike suits. Third, it promotes law development by permitting 
Delaware to interpret its corporate law in the context of the state’s broader 
regulatory regime. 
                                                     
186. See Transcript of Settlement Hr’g and Req. for Att’ys’ Fees and the Ct.’s Rulings at 74, 
Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. Jul. 8, 2015) 
(Laster, V.C.) (refusing to approve settlement); Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hr’g at 17–
18, In re Intermune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015) (Noble, V.C.); 
Mem. Op. at 11–15, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.). According to some reports, even these pre-Trulia 
decisions resulted in a significant decline in merger litigation. See Daniel W. Halston & Alexandra C. 
Boudreau, After In re Trulia: Increased Scrutiny for the Give and the Get in Disclosure Settlements, 
WILMERHALE: PUBLICATIONS AND NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/ 
publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179880878 [https://perma.cc/A7LL-TEFG]. 
187. See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 819 (Del. Ch. 
2011) ($300 million fee award); Gina Chon & Joe Palazzolo, An Early Christmas for These Lawyers: 
$300 Million in Fees for Shareholder Case Sets Off Debate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204296804577124772580624142. See generally 
David Marcus, Delaware’s Chancery Grapples with Multijurisdictional Litigation, DAILY DEAL, 
Dec. 9, 2011, 2011 WLNR 26934635; Cain & Solomon, supra note 172, at 469 (finding that Delaware 
awards higher attorney’s fees but dismisses a greater proportion of cases than other states). 
188. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (noting that companies can adopt charter or bylaw forum terms 
to address concern of suits filed in jurisdictions “more hospitable to signing off on settlements of no 
genuine value”). 
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5.  The Special Problem of Waiver and Representative Litigation 
We consider one additional question that generally presents no issues 
in the context of ordinary contractual forum-selection provisions: whether 
the corporation should be permitted to waive the clause in favor of a non-
selected forum. In our discussion of “Trulia”-forum-terms, we assumed 
that the corporation would seek to enforce the provision. However, most 
actual provisions permit the company to waive the clause and the 
company may want to do so. 
In our view, waivers may in some circumstances be beneficial. This 
may occur, for example, when the selected forum cannot efficiently 
dispose of the litigation because of a lack of jurisdiction. However, a 
corporate board sometimes may elect to waive a forum-term for self-
interested reasons, rather than for convenience or interests of justice, 
necessitating close scrutiny of a waiver. 
Although parallel litigation often is described as a costly scourge for 
defendants, defendants may benefit strategically—in ways that are not 
beneficial to shareholders—when parallel representative suits are filed. 
This structural problem stems from the requirements of Full Faith and 
Credit: the first case to come to judgment will have preclusive effect on 
any subsequent claims. As a result, the plaintiffs’ law firm that concludes 
the first lawsuit is the firm most likely to receive legal fees as part of the 
judgment. The ensuing competition among plaintiffs’ law firms can 
motivate a “race to settle” that may be won by the firm willing to settle on 
the cheapest terms.189 The need for speed also reduces incentives to 
investigate claims to determine their actual strength, to the detriment of 
the shareholders.190 
The ability of the corporation to waive charter or bylaw forum-terms 
provides no protection for shareholders from these competitive dynamics. 
Knowing that a forum-term can be waived incentivizes plaintiffs’ counsel 
                                                     
189. Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: 
A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998); Arthur R. Miller & David 
Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910 (1987) 
(noting that “separate actions induce a rush to judgment”); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 462. 
190. Thomas, supra note 57, at 1946–47; Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder 
Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 505–07. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel 
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 789 (3d Cir. 1995) (“With early settlement, both parties have 
less information on the merits. . . . Without the benefit of more extensive discovery, both sides may 
underestimate the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims.”); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 474–75 (noting 
that pressure to settle results in plaintiffs’ lawyers commencing settlement negotiations before they 
have undertaken substantial discovery). 
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to file suit in a non-selected forum that is less than robust in its scrutiny 
of settlements and to offer terms that are attractive to the company by 
giving it an insurance policy against future claims, but that are not 
beneficial to the shareholders.191 
Whether a waiver is proper thus depends on the particular 
circumstances. Assume a situation in which multiple suits are pending, 
including a suit in the selected forum. If defendant seeks to waive the 
selected forum, and plaintiffs object, one might suspect that the waiver is 
the product of a “race to settle.” But even if only a single suit is filed, or 
if the plaintiff who filed a parallel suit in the selected forum does not 
object to the waiver, a waiver can undermine Delaware’s judicial policy 
against disclosure-only settlements and low-recovery settlements with 
broad releases. 
To address this potential for abuse, in our view, judges in the non-
selected forum have a special duty to monitor their role in any proposed 
settlements. Because the company has adopted a forum-term and has a 
plausible argument for dismissal of the lawsuit in the non-selected forum, 
the company’s decision to pursue settlement with a lawyer in the non-
selected forum raises at least a yellow flag. The judge presiding over a 
suit in a non-selected forum generally ought to give particular attention to 
objections to a proposed settlement when it is accompanied by waiver of 
a forum-term and a competing action is pending in the selected forum. In 
such a situation, the waiver may serve as a signal for an unfair settlement 
or, at the least, that the claims have not been sufficiently investigated to 
justify preclusion. 
Judges in the selected forum also can monitor decisions to waive a 
forum-term. When multiple actions are pending, objectors who have filed 
suit in the selected forum may seek an injunction against the company-
defendant from waiving the forum-term or agreeing to a settlement in a 
case pending in a non-selected forum.192 Generally, principles of 
                                                     
191. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal 
Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t 11 (Fordham U. Sch. of Law, Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 
2855950, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950 [https://perma.cc/V52D-J3N3], to be included in 
THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, 
eds., forthcoming 2018) (arguing that corporate defendants often do not want to invoke exclusive 
forum-terms in order to pursue disclosure-only settlements that would not be approved in Delaware 
under Trulia). 
192. See Wasserman, supra note 169, at 511 (“A court entertaining a class action may, in some 
circumstances, enjoin the parties from initiating additional suits or prosecuting dueling actions 
previously filed.”). To be sure, an injunction may not be able to bind absent class members and the 
alternate forum court may not enforce it and proceed with the litigation. See Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Antitrust Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1148 (1998); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 511–12, 518. But the selected forum court’s ability to 
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federalism and comity have made courts reluctant to enjoin proceedings 
in other courts,193 and a state court lacks authority to enjoin a federal 
proceeding.194 So far, Delaware courts have not had occasion to enforce 
forum-terms aggressively in this manner. But litigation subject to 
corporate forum-terms is still in its infancy, and—as we have argued—
the factors for and against their enforcement differ from the run-of-the-
mine contractual forum-selection provision. Even if a court in the selected 
forum would be reluctant to issue an injunction, the court could make a 
strong appeal to the court in the alternate forum state requesting that that 
court not approve any settlement. Although there is no formal mechanism 
for coordinating inter-state judicial relations, informal mechanisms have 
developed in other contexts in which Delaware has participated.195 
In addition, the corporation’s decision to waive a forum-term could be 
monitored as a breach of fiduciary duty by the board members who have 
approved the waiver. To be sure, such a claim would generally require a 
showing that a majority of the directors had a material conflict of interest 
                                                     
hold the defendant in contempt provides significant incentives to the defendant to comply. See Polly 
J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 791 (1998) (noting that, 
unlike individual defendants, multi-state corporations cannot simply absent themselves from the 
forum that issued the injunction and thereby render enforcement difficult).  
193. See State ex rel. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. 1978) (stating that 
“the power of one State’s court of equity to restrain persons within control of its process from the 
prosecution of suits in another State is clear, but on comity considerations, it should be employed with 
great caution”). 
194. 21 C.J.S. COURTS § 227 (1990) (stating that “[A] court which has acquired jurisdiction of the 
parties has power . . . to enjoin them from proceeding with an action in a court of another state . . . 
with respect to a controversy between the same parties of which it obtained jurisdiction prior to the 
foreign court. This power of a court should be exercised sparingly.”) (footnotes omitted); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 523 (1996) (explaining that courts are 
usually sensitive to interstate comity and usually require a convincing reason for an injunction); 
Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary 
Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 927–28 (noting the “comity 
barriers” to interstate injunctions); Wasserman, supra note 169, at 512. On the lack of state authority 
to enjoin a federal proceeding, see, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 21 n.24 (1983) (explaining that the Court does not suggest that a state court’s injunction could 
have prevented the petitioner from instituting the federal action); Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 
12, 12 (1977) (holding that “it is not within the power of state courts to bar litigants from filing and 
prosecuting in personam actions in the federal courts”); id. at 17 (stating that “the rights conferred by 
Congress to bring in personam actions in federal courts are not subject to abridgment by state-court 
injunctions, regardless of whether the federal litigation is pending or prospective”); Donovan v. City 
of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (stating that “state courts are completely without power to restrain 
federal court proceedings in in personam actions”).  
195. See Randall S. Thomas, 19th Annual Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference: The 
Economics of Aggregate Litigation: What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in M&A 
Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2013) (discussing the need for “greater coordination among 
judges in different courts”). 
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in granting the waiver or lacked independence.196 But in a proper case, 
such a showing could be made. In particular, because the Delaware 
judiciary has identified certain forms of settlements as raising serious 
concerns, it may view skeptically a board decision to waive Delaware as 
a selected forum in order to join such a settlement. 
Finally, a lawyer advising a Delaware company would likely tell the 
board to think twice before waiving a forum-term that selects Delaware in 
order to enter into a settlement of the sort condemned in Trulia—low 
recovery, high fee, broad release, and minimal pre-filing investigation. A 
company that has not adopted a forum-term favoring Delaware could 
plausibly argue that such a settlement benefits the shareholders by 
disposing of litigation that otherwise would consume corporate resources 
and threaten a proposed merger—thus justifying expedition and attorney’s 
fees despite a low recovery for the shareholders. Paradoxically, a 
company in this position could plausibly argue further that a broad release 
will facilitate consummation of the acquisition, which otherwise might be 
stalled by sequential suits by the same or a different set of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. 
But these arguments are not available to a Delaware company that has 
adopted a forum-term in favor of Delaware. Such a company, when sued, 
could expect dismissal without payment of attorneys’ fees—that is the 
point of the Delaware court’s approach in Trulia. Thus, a defendant does 
not need to take any additional steps to avoid delaying consummation of 
the deal. If, however, that company seeks to settle in an alternative forum 
and to waive the forum-term, one may suspect that the defendant’s desire 
for a broad release may stem from concerns that a more diligent 
investigation by a different set of lawyers will uncover more serious 
claims. Even if the Delaware courts are not receptive to enjoining the 
waiver or the settlement, or to seeing the waiver as a breach of fiduciary 
duty, defendant’s counsel, as officers of the court, may be reluctant to 
injure their reputational interests by taking a course that runs counter to 
Delaware’s Trulia policy. Thus, as long as the Delaware courts are willing 
to monitor waivers, the forum-term for a Delaware company may be 
difficult to waive in a context involving parallel lawsuits. 
CONCLUSION 
So far we have considered the import of corporate forum-terms for 
adjudicative practice and argued that the justification for their use cannot 
rest only upon litigant consent. We conclude by considering the 
                                                     
196. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
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implications of exclusive corporate forum-terms for state competition for 
attracting incorporations—a question completely obscured by the 
contractual approach. 
The literature about state competition for incorporation inevitably 
points to the quality of the Delaware judiciary as a magnet for a 
company’s decision to locate in that state.197 This preference is distinct 
from the benefit of having Delaware law govern in a dispute involving the 
corporation. From this perspective, a policy authorizing a corporation to 
adopt a forum-term designating Delaware courts as exclusive fora through 
a charter or bylaw provision makes it more likely that companies that 
incorporate in Delaware will get the benefit that they seek—claims 
involving the firm will be adjudicated in Delaware.198 As such, it increases 
Delaware’s competitive edge by bolstering its attraction as a state of 
incorporation.199 Similarly, to the extent that the Delaware court’s 
“Trulia” approach to settlement is seen as value enhancing, then an 
exclusive forum-term that locks in that approach for a Delaware 
corporation likewise bolsters Delaware as a site of incorporation. 
Maintaining a steady flow of corporation cases into Delaware benefits 
the state in another way, too. In addition to the quality of its judiciary, 
incorporation decisions also take account of Delaware’s extensive 
decisional law on corporate matters. By having disputes adjudicated in its 
own courts, Delaware can more easily control doctrinal development by 
resolving legal ambiguity and increasing the body of precedent than it 
                                                     
197. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1995) (noting the quality of Delaware 
courts); Klausner, supra note 143, at 845 (same); Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 125, at 277 
(same).  
198. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. 
U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990) (arguing that quality of state courts is one reason why corporations 
incorporate in Delaware); Romano, supra note 125, at 276–77 (same). 
199. In some cases, a certification process can facilitate a court’s correct application of another 
state’s law (a presumable goal of an exclusive forum provision selecting the state of incorporation’s 
courts). Indeed, Delaware makes certification available in a number of unusual contexts, such as 
certification of questions by federal agencies and by bankruptcy courts. See Verity Winship, 
Delaware Invites Certified Questions from Bankruptcy Courts, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 427 (2014); Verity 
Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law Questions by Federal 
Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181 (2010). But certification has several shortcomings. A court from 
another forum hearing an intra-corporate dispute of a Delaware firm is not required to seek guidance 
from the Delaware high court; the answering of a certified question differs from deciding a case on a 
full factual record as a certified question typically is framed as a question of law, and not as the 
application of law to facts; and a principal attraction is Delaware’s trial court, which would not be 
involved in any certification. 
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could by sharing interpretative authority with other state courts.200 
Exclusive forum-terms in the charter and bylaws of Delaware 
corporations selecting the Delaware Chancery Court as forum thus 
enhance Delaware’s position in the market for incorporations, and 
Delaware case and statutory law validating such provisions could be seen 
as state actions designed to make Delaware more attractive as domicile. 
Any measure that enhances the attractiveness of Delaware as a 
domicile makes it harder for other states to compete with Delaware. 
Delaware could not directly oust other states of hearing disputes 
concerning Delaware corporations and decided under Delaware law. With 
respect to forum-terms, the state can achieve this goal indirectly through 
the mechanism of private ordering.201 
In addition to competition for incorporations, forum-terms affect 
competition for corporate litigation. Because lawsuits can be filed in states 
other than the state of incorporation, competition for corporate litigation 
is distinct from competition for incorporations. Indeed, attracting 
incorporations and attracting litigation benefits different constituents. In 
the case of Delaware, the principal direct beneficiary of attracting 
incorporations is the fisc: Delaware obtains hundreds of millions of 
dollars, amounting to one-third of its total revenues, from corporate 
franchise taxes. Most other states, by contrast, would obtain only trivial 
additional revenues by attracting incorporations.202 
The principal direct beneficiary of attracting corporate litigation, for 
any state, is the local bar, whose members are likely to represent the 
plaintiffs and defendants in such suits. States would benefit only indirectly 
                                                     
200. In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 959 (Del. Ch. 2007) (emphasizing the 
“coherence-generating benefits created” when a state court enforces its own laws and calling this a 
“compelling public policy interest in deciding these disputes”). See also Klausner, supra note 143, at 
775–79 (noting externalities created by large body of corporate law precedents). Moreover, the 
Delaware judiciary arguably can retain expertise by resolving a steady stream of corporate disputes. 
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1908, 1925–27 (1998). 
201. Moreover, exclusive forum-terms may hamper other states in a particular way that goes 
beyond merely making Delaware more attractive. Because only a small number of publicly traded 
companies choose to incorporate in any state other than Delaware, any state that wants to enhance its 
market position by developing judicial expertise must find a source of corporate disputes for its courts 
to decide. Attracting disputes involving corporations incorporated in other states would ameliorate 
this difficulty. A corporate forum-term selecting Delaware as an exclusive forum reduces this 
potential. Exclusive forum-terms favoring Delaware thus not only make Delaware more attractive, 
but also make it harder for other states to compete with Delaware. 
202. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1219–25 (2001). 
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from taxing the income of local lawyers and may incur costs in providing 
adjudicatory services.203 
Several states, including Delaware, have adopted legislation that 
permits firms incorporated in the state to adopt forum-terms designating 
local courts as exclusive fora for certain disputes, but invalidates forum-
terms that designate the courts of another state as exclusive fora. 
According to a member of the Council of the Corporation Law Section of 
the Delaware State Bar Association involved in the drafting of Delaware’s 
forum-term legislation,204 one motivation for this legislation was to 
prevent companies, especially those with a controlling shareholder, to 
select an exclusive forum with controller-friendly procedural rules.205 But 
by adopting legislation that bars corporations from selecting the courts of, 
say, its headquarter state or of the state where most production facilities 
are located as exclusive fora (unless they are also incorporated in the 
state), legislatures departed from the enabling approach of its corporate 
law—an approach that provides the conceptual foundation for a 
corporation’s adoption of a forum-term and its enforceability by sister 
courts.206 
                                                     
203. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1586 
(2002) (arguing that the self-interest of lawyers outside of Delaware in maintaining litigation business 
induces them to advise clients to incorporate in their headquarter state).  
204. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 851, 858 n.47 (2016) (citing Francis G.X. Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and 
Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.eckertseamans.com/app/uploads/Pileggi-Westlaw-Journal-Delaware-Corporate-
03.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP2C-8YJ3]) (describing 2015 changes proposed by Delaware Bar’s 
Corporate Law Council prior to enactment of Section 115). See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political 
Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 
1147 (2002) (noting a “strong legislative norm in Delaware in favor of deference to the Corporate 
Law Section of the Bar Association”). 
205. Cf. City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, 99 A.3d 229, 230–31 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(decided shortly before the legislation was adopted, upholding the ability to select the courts of other 
states as exclusive fora in a case where the controlling shareholder of a North Carolina headquartered 
company selected courts in North Carolina). North Carolina permits an award of attorneys’ fees to 
class action lawyers only under the “common fund” doctrine, where the litigation results in a monetary 
award to the class members, or if they are paid pursuant to a settlement agreement. See Mark Hiller, 
NC Court of Appeals Approves Payments of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action Settlements, ROBINSON 
BRADSHAW: CAROLINAS CLASS ACTION (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.carolinasclassaction.com 
/index.php/2015/09/nc-court-of-appeals-approves-payments-of-attorneys-fees-in-class-action-
settlements/ [https://perma.cc/N4T5-N47Y]. 
206. While recognizing that the proposal came at the cost of litigant autonomy, and that it deviated 
from the enabling model of Delaware law, the Council nevertheless defended the bill as essential to 
maintain Delaware as the forum for corporate-law disputes: 
The Council believes that stockholders of Delaware corporations should not be denied access to 
the protection of the Delaware courts. Thus, the broadly enabling nature of the DGCL would be 
trimmed back to address this issue. In particular, the Council believes that the value of Delaware 
as a favored jurisdiction of incorporation is dependent on a consistent development of a balance 
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We are not in a position to determine the reasons that led various states 
to adopt such forum-term legislation. Delaware’s main goal may have 
been protecting minority shareholders or enhancing its attractiveness as 
domicile to obtain higher franchise tax revenues and perhaps other states 
may have just copied Delaware’s approach. But given the self-interest of 
the local lawyers who often play a major role in the drafting of such 
legislation, it is plausible that some states sought to further the interest of 
the local bar in attracting litigation to local courts. Promoting private 
interests in this way cuts deeply into principles of judicial federalism, 
raising concerns under the Commerce Clause and the norm of state 
equality. To that extent, the adoption of legislation that on its face 
discriminates in favor of in-state courts may provide grounds for sister 
states to refuse to enforce forum-terms that were adopted after such 
legislation was enacted. 
 
                                                     
of corporate law, and that the Delaware courts are best situated to continue to oversee that 
development. 
Q&A Accompanying Draft Legislation Banning Fee-Shifting Bylaws 4, Prepared by the Corporation 
Law Council, Delaware State Bar Association, 2015, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/legislation/delaware-stat-revisions/Council-Second-Proposal-FAQs-3-6-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HUE8-VGKK]. 
